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Abstract
The United States Department of Defense spends billions of dollars annually on
outsourcing functions to private contracted companies without knowing if their actions
are effective. Guided by Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett’s theory of privatization and
President Eisenhower’s warnings of the impending military-industrial complex, the intent
of this grounded theory study was to develop relevant theory regarding how the
Department of Defense might accomplish missions through outsourcing during current
and future fiscal constraints. This study sought to understand the perceived effectiveness
of outsourcing Department of Defense functions through the perspectives of 2
employment groups directly affected by such outsourcing: federal employees and
privately contracted employees. In this study, 24 federal employees and 20 privately
contracted employees completed qualitative surveys about their perceptions of
effectiveness in regards to outsourcing Department of Defense functions. Data were
inductively analyzed through open, axial, and selective coding via constant comparison.
Findings from this study generated a grounded theory, one positing that 2 distinct
elements are important in outsourcing during fiscal constraint: well defined legal
requirements and private sector technical expertise. Evidence from this study suggests
that when these elements are in place, outsourced Department of Defense functions can
progress, regardless of fiscal restrictions. The implications for social change include
assisting political leaders with better decision making in support of effective national
security policies, while providing good stewardship of tax payer funds.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
As the U.S. economy struggles, government organizations find it difficult to
provide quality services to the public. This economic strain on government organizations
has spilled over into national security and how the Department of Defense conducts
business. The Department of Defense budget was reduced by $37 billion in fiscal year
2013 (American Forces Press Service, 2013). With a decrease in defense spending and a
decreased number of civilian and active military personnel, the Department of Defense is
relying heavily on private-sector contractors to perform national security duties (Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2013). On July 18, 2013, the Department of
Defense reported a total of 669,693 contracted full time equivalents (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense-Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2013). The intent of
this study was to develop relevant theory regarding how the Department of Defense
might accomplish missions through outsourcing during current and future fiscal
constraints.
In order to provide strong national security while enduring a large budget cut, the
Department of Defense must understand the effectiveness of these outsourced functions.
Earlier studies have focused on contract oversight and misconduct amongst contracted
private employees during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
This study focused on the perception of effectiveness of the privately contracted
employees who work alongside federal employees. Understanding the perceptions of
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these two groups led to identification of methods to improve contractor effectiveness.
Improving contractor effectiveness can lead to better stewardship of U.S. tax dollars.
Background of the Study
During President Eisenhower’s two terms in the White House, he witnessed the
expanded growth of national defense spending to contribute to the Cold War’s arms race.
This expanded national defense spending was reflected in the creation of a permanent
armaments industry which contributes to the national defense of the United States.
During his 1961 farewell address, President Eisenhower proclaimed, “The potential for
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist,” in regard to the “militaryindustrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1961, p. 1).
President Eisenhower’s warnings of the rise of the military-industrial complex
and President Obama’s announcement that government contracts exceeded $500 billion
in 2008 raise the concern of how outsourcing Department of Defense functions to private
companies has added to misplacement of power and increased costs (Obama, 2009). In
fiscal year 2010, defense spending climbed to $685 billion (U.S. Government Printing
Office, n.d.). In contrast, the proposed base defense budget for fiscal year 2015 is $495.6
billion and an additional $58.6 billion for overseas contingency operations, highlighting
the need to examine the impact of outsourcing the Department of Defense (Garamone,
2014; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2014a).
In August 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the loss of
$100 billion from the Department of Defense budget over the next 5 years. In September
2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced a loss of $487 billion over the next
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10 years (Panetta, 2012). With the unclear budget figures for the Department of Defense
over the next 10 years, there is clearly a large amount of funding that will be cut. These
multibillion dollar cuts will require a more efficient way of doing business for the
Department of Defense in order to maintain a reasonable level of national security for the
United States of America.
The total proposed procurement funds within the fiscal year 2015 Department of
Defense budget equates to $90.7 billion (Office of the Undersecretary of DefenseComptroller, 2014b). In comparison, the fiscal year 2013 procurement costs totaled
$115.1 billion, and costs were $119.9 billion in fiscal year 2012 (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2013). The total drop in procurement costs for
the Department of Defense from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2015 equated to a loss of
$29.2 billion (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2014b). In addition
to the decrease in procurement funds, the Department of Defense must also be concerned
with the ability of the federal employee/contractor mixed work environment effectively
meeting mission needs.
Adams and Balfour (2010) focused on ethical issues and how outsourcing
enhances or diminishes the government’s ability to deliver public services. They noted
conflicts of interest and the difficulty of perceiving the blurred boundaries between the
public and private sectors. On September 12, 2011, the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy issued Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical
Functions (Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 2011). This policy letter provided
detailed definitions of inherently governmental and critical function, as well as policy to
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ensure only government officials make decisions and perform actions of significant
public interest (Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 2011). Seven months after the
issuance of the policy letter, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO,
2012) published a study focused on accountability for the Department of Defense’s
inventory of contracted services. In April 2012, the U.S. GAO (2012) recommended the
military departments develop guidance regarding authority, responsibility, and
accountability while conducting an inventory review of contracted services. The U.S.
GAO also acknowledged that there were known instances of contractors performing
inherently governmental functions within the Army and Air Force, and recommended the
two military departments resolve those known instances.
Problem Statement
The U.S. Department of Defense spends billions of dollars annually on
outsourcing functions to privately contracted companies without knowing if these actions
are effective. The Department of Defense budget has been reduced by $194.8 billion
from fiscal year 2010 to the proposed fiscal year 2015 budget (Garmaone, 2014). In
fiscal year 2012 procurement funds equated to $119.9 billion. The proposed procurement
funds for fiscal year 2015 equates to only $90.7 billion. From fiscal year 2012 to fiscal
year 2015 the total procurement funds are being reduced by $19.2 billion (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2014b).
Existing research on outsourcing has addressed the lack of transparency and
misconduct of contracted companies and their employees (Avant & Sigelman, 2010;
Krahmann, 2010). However, none of the literature was directly focused on the perceived
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effectiveness of the outsourced functions from those who work in a mixed environment
of federal and privately contracted employees in a noncombat zone. Outsourcing is
defined as, “To send away (some of a company’s work) to be done by people outside of
the company” (Outsource, 2014, para. 3). However, many federal and privately
contracted employees work together in the same offices, side-by-side and on a day-to-day
basis, to accomplish the mission of defending the United States. Often, teams within the
Department of Defense include both federal employees and privately contracted
employees to complete projects and meet mission requirements. This first-hand
understanding of the advantages, challenges and pitfalls of operations are why these two
employment groups were in the best position to provide insight on the perceived
effectiveness of the outsourced functions.
Several researchers have effectively studied perceptions among employees (Kelty
& Bierman, 2013; Schaub & Franke, 2010). Kelty and Bierman (2013) conducted a
study of U.S. Army civilian employees and U.S. Army active military members serving
in Iraq and Afghanistan to understand perceptions of private contractors serving
alongside them in the war zone. They found that the U.S. Army employees believed the
privately contracted employees were providing flexibility and effectiveness to the
mission; however, they believed efficiency and cost savings were lacking. Schaub and
Franke (2010) conducted a survey of military officers and privately contracted employees
who had performed in an armed capacity within a war zone. They found that military
officers were not comfortable labeling armed private contractors as professionals in
combat roles. Schaub and Franke recommended future research to explore the

6
effectiveness of the contractor–military working relationship in an unarmed environment.
Therefore, this study filled the gap and focused on effectiveness of the federal/contractor
mixed environment outside of a war zone, as perceived by both employee groups.
Otara (2011) stated, “No two people experience and interpret sensations,
situations, or their own feelings the same way” (p. 21). The climate and effectiveness of
a working environment are shaped by the perceptions of leaders, managers, and
employees within an organization (Otara, 2011). This study focused on how employees
think about or understand the effectiveness of outsourcing within the Department of
Defense from their own experiences. Jordan, Lindsay, and Schraeder (2012) stated,
“Improving the performance of [private sector] organizations can be enhanced through a
more comprehensive awareness of employees’ perspectives, attitudes and behaviors” (p.
675). Therefore, the employees who are directly involved with outsourcing in the
Department of Defense were in the best position to understand how outsourcing affects
the mission. Understanding the employee’s perception of effectiveness provided
valuable insight to how the Department of Defense mission is being accomplished (Kelty
& Bierman, 2013; Schaub & Franke, 2010). Studying the perceived effectiveness of
outsourcing functions provides the Department of Defense with a basis to either
incorporate more or less outsourcing to privately contracted companies. It is important
for the government to implement effective policies that support national security, while
acting as good stewards of U.S. tax dollars. Understanding the perceived effectiveness of
outsourcing Department of Defense functions identifies shortfalls in mission
accomplishment (Kelty & Bierman, 2013; Schaub & Franke, 2010).
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to gain insight on the perceived effectiveness of
Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the
view of both federal and privately contracted employees. This study investigated the
perceptions of contractor effectiveness from the viewpoint of federal and privately
contracted employees who are not serving in a combat zone. This study focused on
federal and contracted employees who either currently work in a federal/contractor mixed
environment or had done so within the past 2 years.
Nature of the Study
According to Creswell (2009), the qualitative method of research is best for
exploring a concept or phenomenon. The qualitative method allows the researcher to
explore a topic when the theory base is unknown (Creswell, 2009). Within qualitative
research, there is more focus on data collection, analysis, and writing (Creswell, 2009).
In this study, I collected qualitative data through e-mailed surveys and document review.
This approach allowed inductive development of a theory from the data rather than the
data being dependent upon how the theory is generated, in a process explained by Glaser
and Strauss (1967).
I collected data from the two employment groups of public and private sector
employees. The public sector employee group was represented by Department of
Defense civilian employees and active military members. The private sector employee
group was represented by private contractors hired by private sector companies to
provide services to the Department of Defense. According to Creswell (2009), a well-
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saturated theory requires data collection from 20 to 30 individuals. This study included a
sample size of 24 public sector employees and 20 private sector employees. Participants
completed e-mailed surveys. The research questions focused on understanding the
individuals’ interpretation of the environment. I analyzed the collected data through
open, axial, and selective coding. Throughout the coding process, I wrote down ideas
about the evolving theory and produced a substantive theory. In this research study, I
also analyzed public documents, including government reports. Chapter 3 includes a
more detailed explanation of the sample size and data collection.
The focus of this qualitative study was on perceived effectiveness of outsourced
functions of the Department of Defense from the public and private sector employees’
views. Studying the perceived effectiveness from the two employee groups provided a
more in-depth picture of outsourcing Department of Defense functions. This study
provided an understanding of how these two groups can successfully work together to
meet mission requirements of the Department of Defense within shrinking budgetary
confines. The research question served as the basis for this research study and for
devising the survey questions. Chapter 3 will further address the design and
methodology of the study.
Research Question
1. What are the perceptions of each employment group (federal employees and
privately contracted employees) towards the effectiveness of outsourcing
Department of Defense functions to the private sector?
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical approach for this study was grounded theory, which allowed
inductive development of a theory from the data rather than having the data being
dependent upon the theory, as explained by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The grounded
theory approach generates a theory after gathering information through interviews,
document reviews, and observations. It involves systematic procedures of data gathering
and analysis built on procedures such as open, axial, and selective coding, as explained
by Creswell (2009).
In this grounded theory study, I built a conceptual framework from the collected
data. There was not much existing information on the perceived effectiveness of
outsourcing the Department of Defense functions from federal and privately contracted
employees’ point of view. I developed the theory from an inductive process of building
from the data to a generalized model or theory. I followed Creswell’s (2009) inductive
logic of research in a qualitative study. The steps were to gather information from
document review and e-mailed surveys, ask open-ended questions, analyze data to form
themes, look for broad patterns or generalizations to form theories from the themes, and
pose generalizations or theories from past experiences and literature (Creswell, 2009).
The grounded theory approach requires constant comparison throughout data
collection (Creswell, 2009). While the case study approach is similar to grounded theory,
the case study is limited by a certain time constraint or activity (Creswell, 2009). The
research study required no limitation on time or activity; therefore, the grounded theory
strategy was most effective for this research study.
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Definition of Terms
Active duty: Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This
includes members of the Reserve Components serving on active duty or full-time training
duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty (Joint Publication 1-02, 2011).
Contracting officer representative (COR): A military or civilian government
employee who is designated and authorized in writing by the contracting officer to
perform specific technical or administrative functions on contracts or orders. (Defense
Acquisition University, 2013).
Federal government source: Any organization within an executive agency that
uses federal government employees to perform the activity (Federal Activities Inventory
Reform Act, 1998).
Government contractor: A person or business, including authorized
subcontractors, that provides products or services for monetary compensation. A
contractor furnishes supplies and services, or performs work at a certain price or rate
based on the terms of a contract. In a military operation, a contractor may be used to
provide life support, construction/engineering support, weapons system support, and
other technical services (Department of the Army, 2003, 3-100.21).
Inherently governmental function: A function that is so intimately related to the
public interest as to require performance by federal government employees (Federal
Activities Inventory Reform Act, 1998).
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Assumptions
In this qualitative study, I assumed the participants would be honest and open
with their responses. The participants in this study were Department of Defense civilian
employees, active military members, and privately contracted employees who were either
currently working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the
past 2 years. I had access to voluntary participants fitting the criteria. I assumed that
conducting e-mailed surveys would not influence participants’ responses and that
necessary government documents would be available for review.
Limitations
This study included 44 total participants. The federal employment group was
represented by 24 employees, consisting of 16 Department of Defense civilians and 8
active duty military members. The private sector employment group was represented by
20 employees. Sixteen of the 20 private sector employees were prior active duty military
members. The inability to locate a majority of privately contracted employees who had
never been employed in the active duty military sub-group may have limited the
perceptions from the private sector employment group. Study participants represented 14
different functional communities. The federal employment group represented 11
functional communities: information systems/cyber, acquisition, operations, contracting,
security, education and doctrine, logistics, intelligence, medical, manpower/personnel,
and strategic plans and policy. The private sector employment group represented five
functional communities: engineering, information systems/cyber, acquisition, mission
support, and operations.
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Delimitations
This study focused on Department of Defense civilian employees, active military
members, and privately contracted employees who were either currently working in a
federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the past 2 years. Expanding
the study participant pool to those who had worked in the federal/contractor mixed
environment within the past 2 years was based on the mobile nature of the possible
participants. For example, many active military members are relocated on recurring basis
every 2 to 3 years.
Significance of the Study
Ideas and recommendations from this research study will benefit the Department
of Defense and other federal, state, and local government agencies. This study filled the
gap in literature by allowing the employees affected by outsourcing of the Department of
Defense to be heard. Determining the perceived effectiveness of outsourcing the
Department of Defense functions to private sector companies will lead to more informed
decision making and responsible stewardship of U.S. tax dollars by political leaders. I
envision positive social change coming from senior leaders within U.S. governmental
agencies, as they are better informed to make decisions. This research study will impact
social change in areas of lawmaking to ensure effective national security policies are
transparent and cost-advantageous. This study helped me as a practitioner and planner in
my ability to develop a strong, balanced argument to assist leaders with making better
decisions.
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The main focus of this study was to develop relevant theory regarding how the
Department of Defense might approach missions through outsourcing during current and
future fiscal constraints. I developed relevant theory through exploring the perceptions of
effectiveness by the employees who are directly affected by the outsourcing of
Department of Defense functions. With the decrease in defense funding, there is a need
to understand if outsourcing is perceived to be effective. Studying the perceived
effectiveness of outsourcing functions will provide the Department of Defense with a
basis to either incorporate more or less outsourcing to privately contracted companies. It
is important for the government to implement effective national security policies, while
acting as good stewards of tax payer funds. Understanding the perceived effectiveness of
outsourcing Department of Defense functions identified shortfalls in mission
accomplishment.
Summary and Transition
Chapter 1 introduced this qualitative, grounded theory study focused on the
perception of effectiveness of outsourced Department of Defense functions to private
contracted companies through the eyes of the federal and privately contracted employees
who work within a mixed federal/contracted environment. Chapter 2 presents the
literature reviewed. In chapter 3, I explain the qualitative research methodology and the
grounded theory approach used for my study. Chapter 4 describes the setting,
demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, and results of
the study. In chapter 5, I provide a summary of the study, interpretation of the findings,
recommendations, and implications of the study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to gain insight on the perceived effectiveness of
Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the
view of both federal employees and privately contracted employees. The U.S.
Department of Defense is spending billions of dollars annually on outsourcing functions
to privately contracted companies without knowing if its actions are effective (U.S. GAO,
2012). From fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2015 the total procurement funds were
reduced by $19.2 billion (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2014b).
This literature review included the most relevant published information concerning the
privatization of Department of Defense functions in the form of outsourcing and
established relevant contextual elements.
The current literature consistently reported on the lack of accountability and
transparency with contracting actions throughout the Department of Defense. In a report
prepared for the Congressional Research Service, Schwartz (2010) declared that there are
numerous problems with the management of contracts and contracted employees. Poor
contract oversight is a common theme throughout the literature. Adams and Balfour
(2010) discovered few or ineffective regulatory controls over private contractors while
performing a case study of the government contracted company Blackwater (now, XE).
This lack of quality contract oversight raises the question of how effectively contracted
employees perform Department of Defense functions. This qualitative study answered
the question of effectiveness by understanding the perceptions of federal and privately
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contracted employees. This chapter will provide a summary of the search strategy,
conceptual framework, and a review of the literature.
Literature Search Strategy
Literature for this review came from examining works by researchers and other
experts in the field, dissertations, government reports, and peer-reviewed journal articles
published within the past 5 years. I gathered the literature through various electronic
databases such as the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office,
Google Scholar, ProQuest, EBSCO Political Science Complete, EBSCO Business Source
Premier/Complete, EBSCO Military and Government Collection, and EBSCO Political
Science Complete: A SAGE Full-Text Collection. I used the following key words:
government contracting, privatization, military-industrial complex, outsourcing,
Department of Defense outsourcing, Department of Defense privatization, military
contractors, private security contractors, civil-military, privatization and national
security, and effectiveness of outsourcing.
This review also included organizational documents from the following
government websites: the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. General Accounting
Office, Air University web portal, the U.S. Department of Defense web site, the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense–Comptroller, the Defense Technical Information Center,
and the Defense Acquisition University. These websites contained valuable information
pertaining to outsourcing costs, budgets, contract oversight reviews, and mission

16
statements. The information contained within these organizational websites was not
available in the reviewed journals.
The theory of privatization and the warnings of President Eisenhower to be wary
of the encroaching military–industrial complex will provide the conceptual framework
for this study. In this chapter, I will review the following topics: contract oversight,
previous studies of employee perceptions, financial background, and ethical and legal
considerations. A summary and conclusions will complete this chapter.
Theoretical Framework
According to Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett (1999), privatization is broadly
defined as, “The shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to
the private sector” (p. 1). Feigenbaum et al. (1999) argued that privatization is a
“political phenomenon versus an economic response to growth of the state and cost of
state provision” (p. 1). This study builds on the theory of privatization by using a
grounded theory study focused on perceptions of the federal employees and the privately
contracted employees in regards to perceived effectiveness of outsourcing Department of
Defense functions. Feigenbaum et al. (1999) argued that a net shrinking of the state is
not always necessarily the result of introducing market forces or transferring public
functions to private companies. By understanding the perceptions of effectiveness of
outsourcing the Department of Defense through the eyes of both the federal employees
and the privately contracted employees, this study developed theory to recognize the
political and economic factors of outsourcing the Department of Defense.
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In his 1961 farewell address to the nation, President Eisenhower warned citizens
to be wary of private company profiteering in the name of the military–industrial
complex. President Eisenhower also expressed concern that elected officials may have
difficulty balancing the need for a large military infrastructure and such profiteering
(Eisenhower, 1961; Janiewski, 2011). During President Eisenhower’s two terms in the
White House, he witnessed the expanded growth of national defense spending to
counteract the Cold War’s arms race. This expanded national defense spending was
reflected in the creation of a permanent armaments industry that contributes to the
national defense of the United States. The permanent armaments industry is grounded in
scientific development. Scientific development provided the tools for national defense.
In turn, scientific advancement required a relationship be established between military
officers and civilian scientists (Kampmark, 2011).
Two years after President Eisenhower’s farewell address to the American people,
the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David E. Linenthal, questioned the
conflict of interest for the scientists involved in the military–industrial complex.
According to Kampmark (2011), Linenthal expressed concern that a scientist could be
conflicted with the desire for independent research and the reality of justifying expenses
under the confines of the military–industrial complex. This conflict of interest has also
been felt in the highest levels of office. After leading Halliburton as chief executive
officer and chairman for 5 years, Dick Cheney became Vice President of the United
States and generated much controversy over government contracts between Halliburton
and the U.S. Department of Defense (Kampmark, 2011). U.S. senators have also
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experienced similar conflicts of interest. For example, 44 states were involved with the
development of the F-22 fighter jet, equating to 88 senators bringing business to their
states (Kampmark, 2011). These conflicts of interest feed into the political phenomenon
under the theory of privatization as expressed by Feigenbaum et al. (1999).
Literature Review
The current literature consistently reported on the lack of accountability and
transparency with contracting actions throughout the Department of Defense. In a report
prepared for the Congressional Research Service, Schwartz (2010) declared that there are
numerous problems with the management of contracts and contracted employees.
Schwartz (2010) discovered that the “DoD did not begin to gather data on contractors
until the second half of 2007” within the U.S. Central Command (p. 4). The U.S. Central
Command has been responsible for both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq since 2001 and 2003, respectively (Torreon, 2012).
Poor contract oversight was a common theme throughout the literature. Adams
and Balfour (2010) discovered few or ineffective regulatory controls over private
contractors while performing a case study of the government-contracted company
Blackwater (now, Academi). Blackwater’s financial presence in government contracting
rose from only $205,000 in contract dollars in fiscal year 2000 to $593 million in fiscal
year 2006 (Adams & Balfour, 2010). The rise in Blackwater’s contracting presence was
accompanied by a string of incidents involving Blackwater employees in Iraq. After four
Blackwater employees were killed and burned by Iraqi insurgents in 2004, Blackwater
employees began offensive tactics which included shooting Iraqi civilians and releasing
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tear gas canisters in Baghdad’s Green Zone injuring U.S. soldiers and Iraqis (Adams &
Balfour, 2010). In addition to the questionable practices of Blackwater employees in
Iraq, Adams and Balfour (2010) also noted that “only 3.5% of Blackwater’s 2006
contract dollars are listed as having been awarded competitively, with more than 70%
awarded by an ‘unknown’ process” (p. 625). Due to cutbacks in government budgets and
personnel, there is a concern that monitoring ethical practices of government contractors
will become even more difficult and in turn, more difficult to protect the public interest
(Adams & Balfour, 2010). In addition to the cutbacks in budgets and personnel
administering and overseeing government contracts, Dickinson (2011) suggested a lack
of prestige associated with military contracting specialists based on limited opportunities
for career advancement within the ranks. This lack of prestige may be translated into a
corps of underperforming contract administrators and/or contracting officer
representatives. The lack of quality contract oversight raises the question of how
effectively contracted employees perform Department of Defense functions.
According to Johnston and Girth (2012), a lack of quality contract oversight
begins with market management. Their grounded theory study gathered data through
semi structured interviews with federal, state, and local contract administrators. Market
management requires, by law or policy, the contract administrators to stimulate
competition by seeking out vendors to contact and solicit (Johnston & Girth, 2012).
Laws and policies also establish preference for specific types of vendors (i.e., veteran
owned, disadvantaged owned, etc.). This stimulation of competition also includes
placing all qualified, willing vendors in a database and awarding contracts to many
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vendors, thereby spreading the wealth and causing contract administrators more work
(Johnston & Girth, 2012). This form of market management does not truly foster
competition, and the cost to manage the market is not factored into contracting decisions
(Johnston & Girth, 2012).
Most of the literature reviewed did not study the perceived effectiveness from the
viewpoint of both the federal employees and privately contracted employees. Three
current studies, and one outdated study, focused on the perceptions of the various
employee groups (Anderson, McGuiness, & Spicer, 2002; Kelty & Bierman, 2013;
Moore, 2011; Schaub & Franke, 2010). Kelty and Bierman (2013) included both U.S.
Army civilian employees and U.S. Army active duty military members in Iraq and
Afghanistan to understand perceptions of private contractors serving alongside them, in
the war zone. The descriptive analysis study showed the Army employees (civilian and
active duty military) believed the privately contracted employees were providing
flexibility and effectiveness to the mission. However, the participants believed that
efficiency and cost savings were lacking (Kelty & Bierman, 2013). The study
participants were most discouraged by the imbalance of pay and benefits between
themselves and the privately contracted employees. According to McCoy (2010), the
estimated average pay for private contractors ranged from $6,000 to $12,000 per month.
In comparison, deployed enlisted military members in the rank of E-5 with 4 years of
service an estimated $3,113.27 per month in 2010 (Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, 2013). Deployed commissioned officers in the rank of O-4 with 8 years of
service earned an estimated $6,429.74 per month in 2010 (Defense Finance and
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Accounting Service, 2013). The Department of Defense government civilians are
compensated through a pay scale of GS-1 through GS-15, based on steps 1 through 10.
The average estimated monthly salary for a GS-8, step 5 deployed Department of Army
government civilian in 2010 was $6,041 (Office of Personnel Management, n.d.; U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, n.d.). While the estimated average pay for a commissioned
military officer and the Department of Army government civilian were above the bottom
pay for privately contracted employees in a deployment environment, the average
enlisted military member earned only about half of the lowest paid privately contracted
employees (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 2013; McCoy, 2010; Office of
Personnel Management, n.d.; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, n.d.).
Moore (2011) conducted a phenomenological study of Department of Defense
federal civilian employees and American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE)
labor union members in Oahu, Hawaii. Moore’s (2011) study focused on core values,
attitudes and beliefs regarding privatization experiences of these participants. Moore
(2011) recommended further research be surrounded by various questions, including
whether or not “private sector employees are subject to disparate treatment as a result of
their co-location with federal civil servants in a federal workplace” (p. 203). The answer
to this recommended question could be a factor in the perceptions of effectiveness from
both the federal employees and the privately contracted employees. The majority of
Moore’s participants favored traditional public service values and approved
implementation of private sector values as an essential means of reforming the federal
sector (Moore, 2011). Acknowledging the necessity for implementing private sector
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values by these Department of Defense civilian employees may lead to the perception of
better communication and cohesion within the federal/contractor mixed working
environment. Therefore, I asked research participants if they approve of the
implementation of private sector values as an essential means of reforming the federal
sector. I believe if this is the view of the participant, the participant may be more apt to
perceive contractors as effective.
In addition to the studies conducted by Kelty and Bierman (2013) and Moore
(2011), Schaub and Franke (2010) performed a survey of military officers and privately
contracted employees. The participating commissioned military officers were students
attending Air University courses within the U.S. Air Force. Attendees of Air University
in-resident courses are selected through a competitive process, and include military
members of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and over 65
partner nations (Deale, 2014). Of the 157 responding commissioned military officers,
126 were serving in the U.S. Air Force and 30 respondents had never been in combat
(Schaub & Franke, 2010). The privately contracted employees who participated in the
study had a law enforcement background and had completed at least one overseas
deployment with a security firm in an armed capacity. Two thirds of the privately
contracted employees surveyed had a military background, and 95% of them had
previously served as enlisted military members (Schaub & Franke, 2010). The study
questioned how the two employee groups view each other, their roles and professional
status. The results stated that the military officers “displayed both vehemence and
ambivalence toward professional status of contractors in such roles” (Schaub & Franke,
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2010, p. 101). The fact that the majority of the surveyed privately contracted employees
had previously served in the military as an enlisted member raises the question of
whether or not the surveyed commissioned military officers had biases against privately
contracted employees based on this fact. However, the study did not ask the
commissioned military officers if they knew the privately contracted employees they had
encountered were formerly enlisted military members. Commissioned military officers
are appointed by the President of the United States, have earned at least an undergraduate
degree, and are trained to be leaders and supervisors of enlisted members (U.S. Air Force
Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2014). Enlisted military members are not required to
have an undergraduate degree and are not appointed by the President of the United States
(U.S. Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2014). This fundamental difference
between commissioned military officers and enlisted military members may be a bias,
translated into the ambivalence and vehemence towards the privately contracted
employees by the surveyed commissioned military officers regarding the professional
status of the privately contracted security employees. The study recommended enhanced
joint training and future research to explore the relationship between military and both
armed and unarmed private contractors (Schaub & Franke, 2010). My study explored the
relationship between military, government civilians, and unarmed privately contracted
employees.
In addition to these more recent studies, an earlier study in 2002, conducted by
Anderson, McGuinness, and Spicer (2002), a team of three commissioned military
officers representing the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Navy, focused
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solely on commissioned military officers or equivalent Department of Defense civilian
employees. From their limited study, Anderson et al. (2002) concludes that while there is
focus on efficiency within the outsourcing practices of the Department of Defense, there
is very little focus on effectiveness. My study focused on effectiveness through the
perceptions of both the federal employees and the privately contracted employees.
While the previous studies discovered in the literature review focused on various
aspects of the federal and private contracted employee relationships, none of the studies
incorporated the perceptions from both the federal employees and privately contracted
employees of effectiveness in an unarmed environment. Kelty and Bierman (2013)
focused on U.S. Army civilian and military members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Moore (2011) focused on Department of Defense civilian employees and American
Federation of Government Employee labor union members serving in Oahu, Hawaii.
Schaub and Franke (2010) focused on competitively selected commissioned military
officers attending U.S. Air Force senior level courses and private security contractors
whose majority had served in the military as enlisted members. Anderson et al. (2002)
focused solely on commissioned military officers or equivalent Department of Defense
civilians. These studies did not include the perceptions of the federal employees (both
military and government civilian) and privately contracted employees in an unarmed,
outsourced environment.
The U.S. combat mission in Iraq ended on August 31, 2010 (Torreon, 2012).
Also, the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan is on schedule to end in 2014 (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014). With the drawdown of U.S. combat missions
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around the globe, the perceived effectiveness of outsourcing within a noncombat
environment was the focus of this study. My study focused on Department of Defense
civilians, military members, and privately contracted employees outside of the combat
zone.
Financial Background
Fiscal year 2001 for the Department of Defense was coming to an end when a
series of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil occurred on September 11, 2001. On October 7,
2001, U.S. and coalition armed forces retaliated against these terrorist attacks by entering
into the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, also known as Operation Enduring
Freedom (Torreon, 2012). On March 20, 2003, U.S. and coalition armed forces entered
into the second front of the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq, also known as Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Torreon, 2012). Within 2 years, the U.S. armed forces were embroiled in
two major operations at one time.
With the increase in armed conflict, contracts awarded by the Department of
Defense to private sector companies grew exponentially. A financial review of contracts
awarded by the Department of Defense from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2010 shows a
sharp, eight-fold increase in the number of contract actions and contract costs. According
to the General Service Administration’s Federal Procurement Data System (n.d.), the
number of contracts awarded by the Department of Defense rose from 79,105 in fiscal
year 2001 to 3,627,420 in fiscal year 2010. The total costs of contract awards also
drastically increased from $45.6 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $367.3 billion in fiscal year
2010 (Federal Procurement Data System, n.d.).
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Ten years after the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, the Budget Control
Act of 2011 was passed (Carter, 2012). The Budget Control Act of 2011 decreases
defense spending by $487 billion over 10 years. The Budget Control Act of 2011 also
threatened sequestration if Congress did not pass a comprehensive budget, which came to
fruition in 2013. Sequestration reduced the Department of Defense budget by $37 billion
in fiscal year 2013 (American Forces Press Service, 2013). Based upon the cuts in the
Budget Control Act of 2011, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff announced a new defense strategy in 2012 (Panetta & Dempsey, 2012).
According to Panetta and Dempsey (2012), the new defense strategy emphasizes a
few key concepts that may impact the outsourcing Department of Defense functions. The
new defense strategy focuses on a leaner and agile force structure, as well as developing
the capability to surge and mobilize as needed (Panetta & Dempsey, 2012). The focus of
the new defense strategy will shift from Afghanistan and Iraq to Asia-Pacific and the
Middle East (Panetta & Dempsey, 2012). With the focus shifting to a leaner force, the
need for contractors may become greater in order to quickly fill positions with trained,
qualified employees.
In addition to the shift to a leaner force, personnel cuts have been announced from
the Office of Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Army. On December
4, 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a 20% reduction in personnel across the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff by 2019, with an expected savings
of $1 billion (Hagel, 2013). The Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff
reductions are to begin immediately and be in place by January 2015 (Hagel, 2013). On
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December 11, 2013, the U.S. Air Force announced an estimated reduction of 25,000
airmen over the next 5 years (Air Force News Service, 2013). The U.S. Air Force also
announced a reduction of 900 civilian positions, while maintaining approximately 7,000
current vacancies, in fiscal year 2014 (Air Force News Service, 2013). On June 25, 2013,
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno announced a reduction of 80,000
soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2017 (Odierno, 2013). On June 19, 2013, the U.S. Navy
announced it would be eliminating 745 Navy civilians, starting in fiscal year 2013 and
completing in fiscal year 2014 (Commander, Navy Installations Command Public
Affairs, 2013). The drastic decreases in budget, government civilian personnel, and
active military members within the Department of Defense may lead to a greater need for
contractor support based on the inability to quickly develop the federal employment
group. The need for additional contractors to augment the Department of Defense is
plausible, as the Department decreases the manpower to complete the mission through
personnel caps and restructuring of the armed forces (Schwartz & Church, 2013).
According to Schwartz and Church (2013), “Post-Cold War budget cuts resulted in an
increased reliance on contractors” (p. 22). The near future need for more contractors to
augment the Department of Defense may add to the ethical dilemmas of today.
Ethical and Legal Considerations
Collaboration between the public and private sectors is important in striking a
balance of mission effectiveness while providing national security. However, making a
profit sets them apart from one another. In Secretary Panetta’s May 2012 ethics
memorandum, he touted the responsibility for all Department of Defense employees
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(military and government civilians) to uphold the public trust (Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 2012). Secretary Panetta went further to write, “Even the perception of
unethical behavior or impropriety must be avoided” (Office of the Secretary of Defense,
2012, p. 1). In order to serve citizens equally, public sector employees must meet the
challenges of providing services effectively. On the other hand, the private sector’s
purpose is to gain a return on investment and create a profit.
Outsourcing Department of Defense functions is broken out into two categories:
inherently governmental and the make-buy criteria which are those functions better to be
outsourced. Determining the functions which are inherently governmental and better to
be outsourced is based upon the manpower mix criteria set forth in the Department of
Defense Instruction 1100.22 (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Personnel &
Readiness, 2010). In addition, the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.60 states, “It
is Department of Defense policy that U.S. Government funds shall not be used to
preserve an industrial capability unless it is the most cost- and time-effective alternative
for meeting national security requirements” (Office of the Undersecretary of DefenseAcquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2014, p. 2). Per Department of Defense
Instruction 1100.22, “Functions that are inherently governmental cannot be legally
contracted” (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Personnel and Readiness, 2010, p.
2). The line of determination between inherently governmental and the make-buy criteria
is time consuming and riddled with over 43 directing publications, as listed in
Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22 (Office of the Undersecretary of DefensePersonnel and Readiness, 2010). Although illegal in accordance with Department of
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Defense Instruction 1100.22 (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Personnel and
Readiness, 2010), the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force both identified privately
contracted employees performing inherently governmental functions and unauthorized
personal services in the fiscal year 2011 Review of Inventory of Contracted Services
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). The U.S. Army identified 936 privately
contracted employees performing inherently governmental functions, and 718 privately
contracted employees performing unauthorized personal services (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2013). The U.S. Air Force identified 473 privately contracted
employees performing inherently governmental functions, and 85 privately contracted
employees performing unauthorized personal services (U.S. Government Accountability
Office, 2013). The contracting process is very complicated, and the number of contracts
and total costs of contracting out both continue to rise. As President Eisenhower warned
during his farewell speech from the White House in 1961, outsourcing national defense to
the private sector places the abilities and interests of the public into the hands of
profiteering private companies (Eisenhower, 1961).
Dickinson (2011) warns that the intermingling of privately contracted employees
and military members may weaken the military culture. When private companies are
hired by the Department of Defense to perform a function or set of functions, the
Department of Defense does not provide training to the contracted company. The
privately contracted company is expected to provide properly trained and equipped
personnel to perform the outsourced function(s). Based on the unique duties of the
Department of Defense, this training requirement may be difficult for the contracted

30
company to meet. Placing undertrained contractors in positions next to qualified military
members and Department of Defense civilian employees to perform a task may put these
employees in a precarious position based on the nature of the function.
Outsourcing security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in privately
contracted employees carrying weapons and providing security against terrorists and
other criminal elements. Outsourcing security operations was originally based upon the
lack of probability of direct confrontation with a uniformed enemy (Terry, 2010).
Indeed, terrorist organizations do not wear uniforms and do not fall under the rules of a
uniformed armed force of a sovereign nation. Military personnel are able to engage in
combat following rules of engagement derived from the Department of Defense Directive
2311.01E (2006). However, privately contracted security employees are private civilians
who are not subject to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; therefore, they are not classified
as combatants under the law of war (Terry, 2010). When private contractors commit
felony offenses outside of the United States, military commanders in control of these
privately contracted employees are responsible for disarming, apprehending and
detaining these suspects (Terry, 2010). Terry (2010) acknowledges the significant
burden of contracted security personnel killing host-nation civilians within the armed
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to death caused by contracted personnel, other issues that have risen
include allegations of fraud, bid rigging, embezzlement, fraudulent overbilling and
kickbacks (Terry, 2010). In order to alleviate the allegations of wrong doing, the
Department of Defense has to provide stronger oversight and management of the
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contracts and privately contracted employees. When privately contracted employees are
assigned a position to support the Department of Defense, military members or civilian
employees must provide oversight as quality assurance inspectors. A contracting officer
representative (COR) is assigned in writing by the contracting officer to perform specific
technical or administrative functions on contracts or orders (Defense Acquisition
University, 2013). The appointed COR is either a military member or government
civilian employee, and “serves in a critical and vital role in assuring contractors meet the
performance requirements of the contract” (Defense Acquisition University, 2013, p.1).
However, Schwartz and Church (2013) found that contracting officer representatives
receive little training on how to work with privately contracted employees.
An example of the need for proper oversight of contractors was discovered in a
2006 U.S. GAO report. According to the U.S. GAO (2006), the U.S. Army estimated
that almost 60,000 contracted private sector employees were supporting ongoing military
operations in Southwest Asia as of December 2006. The U.S. GAO report (2006) went
on to find that some military commanders in Iraq were unable to determine the number of
privately contracted employees and the support being provided by these privately
contracted employees. As of March 2013, 108,000 privately contracted employees were
in Afghanistan, comprising 62% of the total force (Schwartz & Church, 2013).
Adams and Balfour (2010) conducted a case study of the government contractor
formerly known as Blackwater (now, Academi). Blackwater changed the company name
in 2009 to Xe after audits were conducted by the State Department Inspector General and
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (Adams & Balfour, 2010).
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Blackwater has since changed the name of the company to Academi (Academi, 2014). In
their study, Adams and Balfour (2010) found few or ineffective regulatory controls.
DeNevers (2009) also studied the Blackwater case. In addition to the lack of proper
controls, DeNevers (2009) questions the legal status of these privately contracted
employees under the existing international humanitarian law framework, and calls for
legislation to regulate the industry for accountability purposes. More specifically, the
classification of combatant or civilian lingers over the Blackwater employees (DeNevers,
2009). Combatants are afforded the right to fight, prisoner of war status, and are
considered a lawful target of attack; however, civilians such as the Blackwater employees
are not protected as combatants and can face criminal charges (DeNevers, 2009).
Cohn (2011) also questions the accountability of privately contracted employees
and offers a theory of civilian control of security agents engaging continuous
measurement of control. Cohn (2011) identifies the various differences between the
public sector and the private sector in the realm of privatization of national security.
While military members are direct employees of the state with a legal system which
emphasizes a strong sense of duty; the private sector emphasizes efficiency and profitmaking (Cohn, 2011). Lavallee (2010) presents a theory of civil-military integration
which also discovers a lack of accountability and transparency in the use of privately
contracted employees within the Department of Defense.
After the Cold War, the Department of Defense began focusing on ways to save
money and became more corporate with a just-in time focus (Lavallee, 2010). In the
private sector, just-in time and cutting costs propels the value of the company. In the
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Department of Defense, the focus is on war fighting and military readiness, in order to
fulfill the national security mission.
With the Department of Defense focused on military readiness and national
security, other facets of military infrastructure have been ignored. The U.S. Army
provides a good example of when outsourcing a project can be beneficial. The U.S.
Army began privatizing their lodging program in 2009. According to a 2010 U.S. GAO
report, the Army hired a private developer to perform major renovations on existing
facilities, as well as developing new construction. Based on the poor conditions of the
Army controlled facilities at the time of privatization, the private developer had to delay
construction for two years based on several life-safety and critical systems deficiencies
(U.S. GAO, 2010). These safety concerns included dysfunctional fire alarms and
buildings not meeting current construction codes (U.S. GAO, 2010). The U.S. Army
employees (military and government civilian) in charge of Army lodging operations were
putting the lives of their customers in danger.
In addition to contract oversight, there are fundamental differences between the
two employment groups. However, there are benefits to hiring private contractors.
Benefits to hiring contractors include the ability to hire contractors faster than the
Department of Defense can develop internal capability, and the ability to release
contractors when their services are no longer needed (Schwartz, 2010). Wedel (2011)
raises the concern of privately contracted employees fulfilling roles that are deemed
inherently governmental and require upholding the national interest. Privately contracted
employees are not accountable to the public, as are military members and government

34
civilian employees. Today, the Department of Defense is comprised of an all volunteer
military. The core function of the active military force is war fighting. These volunteer
military members have signed on to die for their country, if required. On the other hand,
it is difficult to believe that private contractors are willing to die for their company
(Wedel, 2011). Jordan et al. (2012) suggest that federal employees are drawn to public
sector organizations, “based on altruism or a calling to serve others” (p. 64). While
military members are assigned to various locations throughout their tenure, Department
of Defense civilians are normally assigned to only one locale and rarely deploy to combat
zones.
Competitive sourcing, also known as A-76, attempts to pit Department of Defense
civilian employees against private contractors (Grasso, 2005). The competition which
ensues between the Department of Defense civilian employees and private contractors
can be disruptive to the mission and possibly hurt morale. The fundamental idea of
hiring Department of Defense civilian employees is to provide a stable work force in
support of the national defense mission. The idea of attempting to pit Department of
Defense employees against profiteering private companies to gain positions is
contradictory of the idea of that stable work force.
Joaquin (2009) speaks of an A-76 manager from the Army Corps of Engineers
who explained, “Except for those very, very routine functions that don’t break the
mission, there is a danger of losing agency capacity when contractor’s fail” (p. 263).
Attempting to simply meet the goals of competitive outsourcing (A-76) just to meet the
mandate does not appear to be effective.
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According to Monahan and Palmer (2009), 70% of the intelligence budget in the
United States of America is devoted to private contractors. The collection and analysis of
intelligence throughout the United States has become a major function belonging to these
privately contracted companies. The burden of data collection and access provided to
these privately contracted employees warrants the concern of impingement upon citizens’
rights. The sharing of intelligence data between public and private sector employees has
also led to “mismatches between security clearances and incorrect assumptions about
whom to include in the information loop” (Monahan & Palmer, 2009, p. 623). In
addition to the accessibility of personal information, there is a lack of standards amongst
the various entities. From lack of standardized technology to insufficient training, the
public and private sector employees assessing, collecting and analyzing personal
information on American citizens is quite unregulated (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). The
possibility of violation of civil liberties is very real.
Summary and Conclusions
Privately contracted employees have been supplementing the Department of
Defense since the Revolutionary War by providing goods and services (Schwartz, 2010).
In today’s modern world, privately contracted employees are also providing services
normally reserved for active military and Department of Defense civilian members. In
Afghanistan and Iraq, privately contracted employees have been providing armed,
security services in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Adams & Balfour, 2010; DeNevers, 2009; Kelty & Bierman, 2013; McCoy, 2010;
Schaub & Franke, 2010; Schwartz, 2010; Schwartz & Church, 2013; Terry, 2010). While
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the growth in privately contracted employees has relieved the federal sector of certain
duties, it has created a need for better contract oversight and management.
Understanding the perceptions of effectiveness from employees affected by contracting
out Department of Defense functions provided a basis for understanding the effectiveness
of such outsourcing.
The purpose of this study was to gain insight on the perceived effectiveness of
Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the
view of both federal employees and privately contracted employees. The theory of
privatization and President Eisenhower’s warnings of the encroaching military-industrial
complex created the conceptual framework for this study. The literature reviewed was
limited from both the federal employees and the privately contracted employees’
perspective. However, the researcher did discover three current and one outdated studies
focused on limited groups. Kelty and Bierman (2013) focused on U.S. Army civilian and
military members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moore (2011) focused on Department
of Defense civilian employees and American Federation of Government Employee labor
union members serving in Oahu, Hawaii. Schaub and Franke (2010) focused on
competitively selected commissioned military officers attending U.S. Air Force senior
level courses at the U.S. Air Force Air University and private security contractors whose
majority had served in the military as enlisted members. Anderson et al. (2002) focused
solely on commissioned military officers or equivalent Department of Defense civilians.
These studies did not include the perceptions of both the federal employees and the
privately contracted employees in a noncombat, outsourced environment.
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A good portion of the literature focused on the financial background of the
Department of Defense budgets in relation to monies spent or to be spent on private
contractors. The majority of the literature reviewed was focused on ethical and legal
considerations of outsourcing Department of Defense functions to privately contracted
companies. Ethical lapses focused on both privately contracted employees and federal
employees. Misconduct of privately contracted employees and companies was well
documented (Adams & Balfour, 2010; Terry, 2010). Dickinson (2011) questioned the
perception of prestige and career advancement opportunities for military members
overseeing contracts. Schwartz and Church (2013) identified the lack of properly trained
contracting officer representatives charged to ensure private contractors are meeting the
performance requirements of the contract. The lack of research on the perceived
effectiveness of outsourcing the Department of Defense from both the federal employees
and the privately contracted employees’ perspective supports the purpose for this study,
as stated in Chapter 1.
Based on the lack of current research on the perceived effectiveness of
outsourcing the Department of Defense from the employees’ perspective, this study was
conducted using a grounded theory strategy of inquiry. Of the five qualitative research
inquiries, the grounded theory approach was the most suitable for this study. The
grounded theory approach allowed inductive development of a theory from the data
rather than the data being dependent upon the theory, as explained by Glaser and Strauss
(1967). The grounded theory approach generates a theory after gathering information
from interviews, document reviews, and observations. Research questions were focused
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on how the individuals experienced the process and identify steps in the process. After
reviewing these answers, I then returned to the participants to ask more detailed questions
based on core phenomenon, causal conditions, strategies, and consequences (Creswell,
2009). None of the literature reviewed focused on the perceived effectiveness of
outsourced Department of Defense functions from the viewpoint of both federal
employees and privately contracted employees. The grounded theory approach allowed
inductive development of a theory from gathering information from emailed surveys and
document reviews to systematically collect data. Phenomenological research, narrative
research, case study research, and ethnographic research were not appropriate for this
study for various reasons which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 will further
describe the research methodology used in this qualitative, grounded theory study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The United States Department of Defense is spending billions of dollars annually
on outsourcing functions to private contracted companies without knowing if their
actions are effective (U.S. GAO, 2012). The purpose of this study was to gain insight on
the perceived effectiveness of Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately
contracted companies from the view of both federal employees and privately contracted
employees. This study focused on federal and privately contracted employees who were
either currently working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had worked in such
an environment within the past 2 years.
This chapter includes a discussion of the research design and rationale. Next, I
provide a justification for the use of a qualitative study design with a grounded theory
approach. The chapter then articulates the role of the researcher, sampling strategy,
instrumentation, procedures for participation recruitment, data collection and analysis,
issues of trustworthiness, and ethical procedures.
I used a qualitative, grounded theory approach to address the research question for
this study. Survey responses and document reviews answered this study’s research
question. I e-mailed surveys to 24 federal employees and 20 privately contracted
employees who were either currently working in a federal/contracted environment or had
done so within the past 2 years.
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Research Question
1. What are the perceptions of each employment group (federal employees and
privately contracted employees) towards the effectiveness of outsourcing
Department of Defense functions to the private sector?
Research Design and Approach
As noted in Chapter 2, the main emerging concepts from the literature review
were the expanding military–industrial complex and the theory of privatization. In 1961,
President Eisenhower warned the American people of the possibility for misplaced power
with the expansion of the military–industrial complex (Eisenhower, 1961). Over 5
decades later, the military industrial complex has indeed grown in both numbers and
strength. The theory of privatization is a second main concept that emerged from the
literature review. The theory of privatization contends that outsourcing is more of a
political phenomenon rather than an economic response (Feigenbaum et al., 1999). This
theory proposes that federal employees are just being replaced with privately contracted
employees with no regard to saving money.
According to Creswell (2009), the qualitative method of research is a problem
best suited for exploring a concept or phenomenon. The qualitative method allows the
researcher to explore a topic when the theory base is unknown (Creswell, 2009). Within
the qualitative research method, there is more focus on data collection, analysis, and
writing (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative data are collected through interviews, observations,
and document review (Patton, 2002).
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This qualitative study was conducted using a grounded theory strategy of inquiry.
The grounded theory approach allows the researcher to inductively develop theory from
the data rather than the data being dependent upon the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
The grounded theory approach is both scientific and attempts to understand emotional
issues. Research questions for the grounded theory approach focus on how the
individuals experienced the process and identify steps in the process. After reviewing
these answers, the researcher then returns to the participants to ask more detailed
questions based on core phenomenon, causal conditions, strategies, and consequences
(Creswell, 2009). None of the literature reviewed focused on the perceived effectiveness
of outsourced Department of Defense functions from the federal and privately contracted
employee’s viewpoint. The grounded theory approach allowed me to generate a theory
by gathering information from e-mailed surveys and document reviews as systematically
collected data.
A phenomenological approach was not appropriate for this study because it was
not my intent to understand the life experiences of the participants. The
phenomenological approach focuses on the meaning of the phenomenon for several
individuals (Creswell, 2009). A narrative approach is similar to a phenomenological
approach. However, the narrative approach focuses on the life experiences of a single
individual versus many individuals. This study was focused on understanding the
perceptions of the participants.
A case study approach was not appropriate for this study because a case study is
bounded in time and explores a process (Creswell, 2009). Limiting the study to a case
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would not allow me to identify how the participants experienced the process. A case
study approach is appropriate when the researcher has clearly identifiable cases
(Creswell, 2009). This study did not have clearly identifiable cases bounded in time.
An ethnographic approach focuses on cultural groups and their shared behaviors,
beliefs, and language (Creswell, 2009). This study did not include a defined cultural
group from an anthropologic lens. Although this study focused on individuals who were
performing Department of Defense functions, the two employment groups surveyed are
not part of a culturally specific group.
I reviewed and interpreted the collected data prior to entering my own personal
experiences into the summary. I maintained a distance from personal bias throughout the
inductive process to develop a more accurate theme and conclusion from the data
collected.
Role of the Researcher
In a qualitative study, the researcher often takes on the role of observer–
participant in order to fully understand the phenomenon (Patton, 2002). I used an
observer-participant approach. I engaged surveys and document reviews to fully
understand the phenomenon. I used purposeful sampling to select individuals who have
experienced the cultural phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). Participants for this study
included two employment groups: public and private sector employees. The public
sector employee group was represented by Department of Defense civilian employees
and active duty military members. The private sector employee group was represented
by private contractors hired by private sector companies to provide services to the
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Department of Defense. This study was focused on these two employment groups who
either currently works in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within
the past 2 years. I as the researcher have ties to both employment groups. I am a retired
active duty military member with 20 years of service, with active service concluding
September 30, 2006. I was also a former private contractor working in a
federal/contractor mixed environment; the last employment date with this contractor was
March 15, 2013.
While I recruited potential participants from previous employment situations, I
did not recruit any participants with whom I had a supervisory or instructor relationship.
I was cognizant of possible personal bias and managed possible bias by asking openended questions of the participants and objectively reviewing documents.
Methodology
A qualitative study focuses on data collection, analysis, and writing (Creswell,
2009). In order to gain insight on the data collected, the researcher must purposefully
select participants who are familiar with the problem. Once the researcher purposefully
selects participants, it is important to then saturate the theory with enough participants
(Creswell, 2009). Once the proper participants are selected, the researcher must ensure
the proper method for collecting data. Constant comparison of the data allows the
researcher to organize and categorize the data for analysis.
Participant Selection Logic
The population for the two employment groups, who were either currently
working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the past 2
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years, is unknown. However, the total population of the public sector employees consists
of approximately 1.98 million employees; 1.4 million active military members and over
580,000 Department of Defense civilian employees. Private sector employees consist of
669,698 contractors (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, 2013). According to Creswell (2009), a well-saturated theory requires data
collection from 20 to 30 individuals. Therefore, this study included a sample size of 24
federal employees and 20 private sector employees. Selected participants were either
currently working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the
past 2 years. Potential participants were selected using snowball sampling. Snowball
sampling allowed the researcher to locate participants who fit the criterion (Patton, 2002).
My past employment as an active duty military member and a private contractor provided
access to individuals within the two employment groups. I have acquaintances in both
employment groups, who in turn knew other potential participants. I am connected via
social media with approximately 75 persons who are connected to one or both of the
employment groups studied.
Instrumentation and Data Collection
I collected data through open-ended surveys and document reviews. Documents
were obtained through official government web sites. These documents included
memorandums, regulations, policies, and other relevant official documents pertaining to
the outsourcing of the Department of Defense. Reviewing official documents related to
the Department of Defense mission, vision, regulations, and policies created a baseline
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for me to juxtapose official perceptions of mission effectiveness to participant responses.
I conducted surveys through e-mail.
I employed standardized open-ended survey protocol. Posing the same basic
questions in an open-ended format increased comparability of responses, and reduced
researcher bias (Patton, 2002). Content validity was established through clarification of
my bias and triangulation of data. I recruited potential participants through snowball
sampling to gain access to individuals who fit the criterion. My past employment as an
active duty military member and a privately contracted employee provided access to
individuals within the two employment groups. I have acquaintances in both
employment groups, who in turn know other potential participants. I am connected via
social media with approximately 75 persons who are connected to one or both of the
employment groups studied. I conducted the surveys through e-mail. Data were
recorded digitally. Based on social media connections, I was able to recruit an adequate
number of study participants. I have maintained contact information for each participant
and informed each participant that a follow up survey may be needed.

Participants were

grouped into three sub-categories based on management position within their
corresponding employment group. Those three sub-categories were distinguished as
lower-level management, middle-level management, and upper-level management.
Active duty military members holding the rank of E-1 through E-6 were classified as
lower-level management; E-7 through O-4 were classified as middle-level management;
and, O-5 through O-10 were classified as upper-level management. Department of
Defense civilian employees GS-1 through GS-6 were classified as lower-level
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management; GS-7 through GS-14 were classified as middle-level management; and,
GS-15 through Senior Executive Service (SES) were classified as upper-level
management. Privately contracted employees self-identified themselves within the three
sub-categories of management based upon their organizational structure.
Data Analysis Plan
Surveys were conducted through e-mail. Survey questions were open-ended to
increase comparability of responses, and reduce researcher bias (Patton, 2002). A list of
survey questions is located Appendix A. Once the surveys were completed, the digital
files were entered into Nvivo 10. An Nvivo file was created for each participant. Coding
in a grounded theory study requires a systematic approach which begins with open
coding, then moves to axial coding, and finishes with selective coding (Creswell, 2009).
I read through all of the data to create a basic description and then proceeded to generate
categories based upon the categories. I then selected one of the categories and positioned
it within a theoretical model. After organizing data into categories, I then began to
develop concepts based upon the categories. Constant comparison was conducted as I
organized and categorized the data.
I incorporated the organized and categorized data into qualitative analysis
computer software to facilitate comparing different codes. Qualitative analysis computer
software allowed for efficient storage and location of the data (Creswell, 2009). I used a
combination of hand coding the data and computer software to analyze the data, based on
the large number of participants.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
Researchers have an obligation to honor trust of colleagues, themselves and
society (National Research Council, 2009). Without establishing trust and validity in
research, researchers are unable to gain truthful knowledge to assist with societal issues.
Researchers must protect participants, develop trust, promote integrity and guard against
misconduct (Creswell, 2009). Credibility in research can be achieved through various
strategies, such as triangulation, member checks, reflexivity, and peer review.
Triangulation can be achieved by obtaining information from a diverse range of
individuals and settings, using a variety of methods (Maxwell, 2013). I recruited survey
participants from 14 different functional communities within the two employment
groups, and reviewed official documents. Member checking requires the researcher to
solicit feedback from the participants (Maxwell, 2013). Member checking was
accomplished by soliciting feedback from five participants.
Transferability establishes repeatable procedures for research. External validity
of the research was accomplished by maintaining digital files and taking strategic notes
(Patton, 2002). Surveys were conducted through e-mail to create automatic digital files.
The use of direct digital feedback from respondents via e-mail created a clear, thick
description of the setting without including trivial information. Collecting data through
e-mail provided a consistent setting dismissing researcher bias from the surroundings.
Dependability in qualitative research requires the researcher’s approach to be
consistent across different researchers and projects (Creswell, 2009). I developed an
audit trail containing survey protocol and transcripts. Constant comparison of the data
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was accomplished with the codes and memoing throughout the study. Codes were crosschecked and queried for consistency using Nvivo 10 and Microsoft Excel 2007.
Qualitative research requires the researcher to delve into the field to study the
phenomenon (Patton, 2002). Entering into the field requires the researcher to remain
objective and applying realism to the study. I sought out the best fit by tracking and
reporting alternative classification systems, themes, and explanations throughout coding
and analysis. In order to remain objective, I included my own thoughts and feelings in
the field notes, as well as personal experiences. Aliases were assigned to each study
participant. Analysis and interpretation of the data were completed without
acknowledging personal identity of the individual participants to assure objectivity.
While I recruited potential participants from previous employment situations, I did not
recruit any participants with whom I or my spouse has had a supervisory or instructor
relationship. Objectively collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the data provided a clear
level of trustworthiness and credibility to the study.
Ethical Procedures
The study required interaction with human participants. Data collection from
human participants presents risks of human rights violations (Creswell, 2009). In order
to protect participants of human rights violations, this study was reviewed by the Walden
University Institutional Review Board. The Walden University approval number for this
study is 05-20-14-0151752 and expires on May 19, 2015. Study participants were
protected through various measures. All potential participants were provided a consent
form, detailing the voluntary nature of the study, identifying the background of the study,
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time commitment, privacy and security of all collected data. Collected data will be
securely stored for at least 5 years via a password-protected computer and a passwordprotected stand-alone hard drive for backup purposes. All participants were identified by
a number alias such as Study Participant 1 (SP 1). I am the only individual with access to
the identifiable information of the participants.
Snowball sampling allowed the researcher to locate participants who fit the
criterion (Patton, 2002). This study required snowball sampling to ensure the participants
belong to one of the two employee groups who either currently works in a
federal/contractor mixed environment or has done so within the past 2 years. Study
participants were represented by two employment groups: public employees and private
sector employees. The public sector employment group was represented by Department
of Defense civilian employees and active duty military members. The private sector
employment group was represented by private contractors hired by private sector
companies perform Department of Defense functions. I as the researcher have ties to
both employment groups. I am a retired active duty military member with 20 years of
service, with active service concluding September 30, 2006. I am also a former private
contractor working in a federal/contractor mixed environment; last employment date with
this contractor was March 15, 2013. Based upon my past and present connections to the
targeted community, I was known to some of the potential participants. I did not recruit
any participants of which I have had a supervisory or instructor relationship. In addition,
my spouse is currently serving as an active duty military member. I did not recruit any
participants of which my spouse has had a supervisory or instructor relationship.

50
Summary
The research design and approach to this study was a qualitative design with a
grounded theory approach. Surveys and document reviews were conducted to answer the
research question. This study included open-ended survey questions with 24 participants
from the public employment group and 20 participants from the private sector
employment group. Snowball sampling was used to ensure participants fit the criterion
of the study. Documents were obtained through official government web sites. I
constantly compared data throughout the study using open, axial and selective coding.
The study ensured credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
throughout data collection and analysis. Participants were protected through privacy,
confidentiality, and security of collected data. This study was reviewed by the Walden
University Institutional Review Board to ensure protection of participants against human
rights violations.
Chapter 4 will describe the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis,
evidence of trustworthiness, and results of the study. Chapter 5 includes a summary of
the study, interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, and
implications of the study.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this research was to gain insight on the perceived effectiveness of
Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the
view of both federal and privately contracted employees. This study focused on federal
and privately contracted employees who were not serving in a combat zone and who
currently work in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the past
2 years. This study was guided by the following research question:
1. What are the perceptions of each employment group (federal employees
and privately contracted employees) towards the effectiveness of
outsourcing Department of Defense functions to the private sector?
I begin this chapter with a description of the setting and present the participant
demographics. I continue with a discussion on how I collected and analyzed the data,
and provide evidence of trustworthiness. I conclude this chapter with a presentation of
the study results and discuss discrepant cases.
Setting
I conducted this study through surveys and document reviews. I obtained
documents through official, public government web sites. I conducted open-ended
surveys via e-mail. Member checking was also conducted through e-mail.
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Demographics
This study included 44 total participants. The federal employment group was
represented by 24 participants consisting of 16 Department of Defense civilians and eight
active duty military members. The private sector employment group was represented by
20 participants (see Figure 1).

Private Sector= 20
Dept of Defense
Civilians = 16
Active Duty Military= 8

Figure 1. Study participants.
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The study participants consisted of 30 males and 14 females. The federal employment
group was represented by 16 males and eight females (see Figure 2).

Male = 16
Female = 8

Figure 2. Gender, federal employment group.
Similar to the federal sector employment group, the majority of the private sector
employees were male. The private employment group was represented by 14 males and
six females (see Figure 3).
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Male = 14
Female = 6

Figure 3. Gender, private sector employment group.

Ages of study participants were captured through age ranges: 18–29, 30–39, 40–
49, 50–59, and 60+. Both employment groups were represented by similar aged
participants. Federal sector employees were represented by one employee in the 18–29
range, three employees in the 30–39 range, four employees in the 40–49 range, 11
employees in the 50–59 range, and two employees in the 60+ range (see Figure 4).
Private sector employees were represented by one employee in the 18–29 range, one
employee in the 30–39 range, eight employees in the 40–49 range, 10 employees in the
50–59 range, and no employees in the 60+ range (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Age ranges of study participants.

The study participants represented 14 different functional communities (see Table
1). The functional communities represented were: engineering, information
systems/cyber, acquisition, mission support, operations, contracting, security, education
& doctrine, logistics, intelligence, medical, manpower/personnel, and strategic plans &
policy. The federal employment group represented the following 12 functional
communities: information systems/cyber, acquisition, operations, contracting, security,
education & doctrine, logistics, intelligence, medical, manpower/personnel, and strategic
plans & policy (see Table 1). The private sector employment group represented the
following five functional communities: engineering, information systems/cyber,
acquisition, mission support, and operations (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Study Participants as Represented by Employment Group and Function
Employment Group
Function

Federal

Private Sector

Total

Info Systems/Cyber
Logistics
Operations
Acquisition
Mission Support
Education & Doctrine

10
4
1
1
0
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

14
0
2
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

24
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

24

20

44

Engineering

Contracts
Security
Intelligence
Medical
Manpower/Personnel
Strategic Plans &
Policy

Federal sector employees were asked to identify their employee management
levels through pay grade bands. Department of Defense civilians were separated using
GS-ratings: GS-1 through GS-6 ratings were identified as lower-level employees, GS-7
through GS-14 ratings were identified as middle-level employees, and, GS-15 through
SES ratings were identified as upper-level employees. Active duty military members
were separated using rankings: E-1 through E-6 rankings were identified as lower-level
employees, E-7 through O-4 rankings were identified as middle-level employees, and, O5 through O-10 rankings were identified as upper-level employees. Private sector
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employees self-identified themselves as lower-level, middle-level or upper-level
management. The study participants consisted of 15 lower-level employees, 21 middlelevel employees, and eight upper-level employees within their organizations (see Table
2).
Table 2
Employee Management Level
Management Level

Lower-level
Middle-level
Upper-level

Employment Group
Federal

Private Sector

Total

4
15
5
24

11
6
3
20

15
21
8
44

All five upper-level federal sector employees were active duty military members,
with two of them not in a supervisory or leadership position. Two of the 14 Department
of Defense civilians were middle-level employees, but were supervising/leading in upperlevel management positions. Twelve employees within the federal sector were not
working in a leadership/supervisory position (see Figure 5).
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2

2

8

Not a Leader

0

Low Leader

1

Mid Leader

1
1

Upper Leader

4
2
1
2
0
Upper Level

Middle Level

Lower Level

Figure 5. Federal sector – leader/supervisor vs. employee management level.

Ten of the 20 private sector employees were not working in a leadership or supervisory
position, to include one upper-level employee. Three of the 11 lower-level employees
were leading or supervising other lower-level employees. Four of the middle-level
employees were leading or supervising other middle-level employees, and one was
leading or supervising a lower-level employee. Two of the upper-level employees were
leading or supervising at their level (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Private sector - leader/supervisor vs. employee management level.

None of the active duty military members had ever been employed as a
Department of Defense civilian or as a private sector employee. Four of the 16
Department of Defense civilians had never been employed as an active duty military
member or as a private sector employee. Out of the 20 private sector employees, 18 had
been previously employed in the federal employment group.
Data Collection
Data were collected through e-mailed surveys and document reviews on official
government web sites. The study was announced through my personal profiles on
LinkedIn and Facebook social media websites. In addition, I directly e-mailed potential
participants. Sixty-three potential participants were contacted, and a total of 44 study
participants responded to the surveys through e-mail. According to Creswell (2009), a
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well-saturated theory requires data collection from 20 to 30 participants. Twenty-four
participants represented the federal sector employment group and 20 participants
represented the private sector employment group. Facebook provided the best results for
recruiting study participants. Twenty-nine of the 38 potential participants contacted
through Facebook participated in the study. LinkedIn produced five participants out of
10 potential participants contacted. Direct email produced 10 participants out of 15
contacted.
The researcher assigned a number alias (i.e. SP 1, SP2) to all potential study
participants. The study participants retained their originally assigned number alias from
the list of potential participants. This method provided me with an extra level of
anonymity when reviewing participant responses. I am the only individual with access to
the participants’ identifiable information. The data were retained in digital file format.
Official government documents were obtained through official government web sites.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (2005) containing updated Federal Acquisition
Circulars FAC 2005-09, Subpart 7.5 – Inherently Governmental Functions (2006) and
FAC 2005-73, Subpart 19.8 – Contracting with the Small Business Administration (The
8(a) Program) (2014) were reviewed.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted after gathering all of the interviews and
demographic questionnaires and entering the digital files into Nvivo 10. An Nvivo file
was created for each participant, containing individual interview responses. Data from
individual participant interview files were then merged into one interview file per
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interview question. An Nvivo file was also created for the demographic responses. Data
from the Nvivo files were then entered into Microsoft Excel 2007 for further comparison.
After reading all of the data, a basic description was created. Next, categories were
developed based on demographics. Collective participant responses, experience in other
employment groups, and employee management level were the most significant
categories based on demographics. The demographic categories of age, gender,
functional community, years employed within current employment group, and
leadership/supervisory position did not provide any significant themes.
After organizing data into categories, concepts were developed based upon the
categories. Data were constantly compared as participant responses were organized and
categorized. Nvivo 10 and Microsoft Excel 2007 were utilized to efficiently store and
locate the data, as well as tools to compare different codes. Through constantly
comparing the data, the most significant themes across the categories were national
security, tax payer savings, function dependent, technical expertise, poor contract
management, and over reliance on the private sector.
Thirty-six of 44 participants were concerned with maintaining national security,
while saving tax payer dollars. Twenty-eight of the 44 participants perceived outsourcing
Department of Defense functions as effective dependent upon the function, and
specifically, when technical expertise is required for the function. Study participant 42
(SP 42) offered, “While there are core components that can’t be outsourced (e.g. combat
function), others are clearly better suited for contractor staff to perform (e.g. researching
and developing new technology, building new weapon systems, military support
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functions, etc.).” Twenty-eight of the 44 participants expressed concern about poor
contract management and over reliance on private sector employees as hurting the
effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions. Study participant 47 (SP
47) stated, “Outsourcing people to help decide on requirements and implementation
leaves too many loyalty questions – is the contract actually working for the betterment of
the government/mission and not for more business.”
Many of the participant responses were similar in nature in both employment
groups for each interview question. However, two discrepant cases were noted. Two
study participants, SP 19 and SP 37, had extreme responses in comparison to the 42 other
participants. While these two participant responses appeared to be extreme, these
discrepant responses were folded into the analysis as examples of differing themes in the
coding process. Discrepant cases will be further discussed in the Results section of this
chapter.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Researchers have an obligation to honor trust of colleagues, themselves and
society (National Research Council, 2009). Without establishing trust and validity in
research, researchers are unable to gain truthful knowledge to assist with societal issues.
Researchers must protect participants, develop trust, promote integrity and guard against
misconduct (Creswell, 2009).
Credibility
Credibility was achieved through triangulation and member checking.
Triangulation can be achieved by obtaining information from a diverse range of
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individuals and settings, using a variety of methods (Maxwell, 2013). Triangulation was
achieved by recruiting participants from 14 different functional communities within the
two employment groups. Member checking was accomplished by soliciting feedback
from five participants. Official documents were reviewed to juxtapose participant
responses.
Transferability
Transferability establishes repeatable procedures for research. External validity
of the research is accomplished by recording interviews in digital files and taking
strategic notes (Patton, 2002). Surveys were performed through e-mail to create
automatic digital files. The use of direct digital feedback from respondents via e-mail
created a clear, thick description of the setting without including trivial information.
Collecting data through e-mail provided a consistent setting dismissing researcher bias
from the surroundings.
Dependability
Dependability in qualitative research requires the researcher’s approach to be
consistent across different researchers and projects (Creswell, 2009). An audit trail was
developed containing survey files. Data were constantly compared using codes and
memoing throughout the study. Codes were cross-checked and queried for consistency
using NVivo10 and Microsoft Excel 2007.
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Confirmability
Qualitative research requires the researcher to delve into the field to study the
phenomenon (Patton, 2002). Entering into the field requires the researcher to remain
objective and applying realism to the study. I sought out the best fit by tracking and
reporting alternative classification systems, themes, and explanations throughout coding
and analysis. Data were objectively collected, analyzed, and interpreted by including
thoughts and feelings in the field notes, as well as personal experiences. Participants
were informed of potential conflicts of interest through the consent form. Individuals
who had been or were currently being supervised or instructed by me or my spouse were
not permitted to participate in the study. All participants were identified by a number
alias such as Study Participant 1 (SP 1). Analysis and interpretation of the data were
completed without acknowledging personal identity of the individual participants to
assure objectivity.
Results
This research study gained insight on the perceived effectiveness of Department
of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the view of both
federal employees and privately contracted employees. This study was guided by the
following research question:
1. What are the perceptions of each employment group (federal employees
and privately contracted employees) towards the effectiveness of
outsourcing Department of Defense functions to the private sector?
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The collective responses of study participants revealed various trends in the
interview data. Although the study consisted of two employment groups representing 14
functional communities and a wide array of experience, there were many common
themes within each interview question. I assumed all participants would be honest and
open with their responses. All participants knew their responses were anonymous, and
were often direct and open with their responses.
Generally, participant responses were similar dependent on their prior experience
within other employment groups. None of the eight active duty military member subgroup had experience as a Department of Defense civilian or as a private sector
employee. Four of the 16 Department of Defense civilians had never been employed as
an active duty military member or as a private sector employee. Twelve of the 16
Department of Defense civilians were previously employed as either an active duty
military member, private sector employee, or as both an active duty military member and
a private sector employee.

Eighteen of the 20 private sector employees had prior

experience in the federal sector group.
Overall, participants from all three employee management levels had similar
responses.

However, some similarities were more evident between the lower- and

middle-level employees across the employment groups. The majority of the participants
were in the middle-level management group, represented by 21 participants. The lowerlevel employees were represented by 15 participants. The upper-level employees were
represented by eight participants.
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Definition of Effectiveness vs. Department of Defense Effectiveness
Thirty-six of the 44 study participants perceived differences between
effectiveness and effectiveness in the Department of Defense context. Mission, national
security, taxpayer savings, and efficiency were common differences perceived from both
employment groups (see Figure 7).
Mission /
National
Security

Effectiveness
vs. Department
of Defense
Effectiveness

Taxpayer
Savings

Efficiency

Figure 7. Effectiveness vs. Department of Defense effectiveness.

One of the two private sector employees who had never been employed in the
federal sector (SP 49) stated,
Outside of the Air Force, I haven’t seen a DoD measure of effectiveness. I
have seen essential (as defined by the customers of that program)
programs cut and non-productive programs continued. All based upon the
whim of the DoD management.
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None of the members of the active duty military sub-group had prior experience in the
private sector employment group. One active duty military member participant (SP 13)
stated that the variation between effectiveness and effectiveness in the Department of
Defense context is attributed to “monetary savings, force multipliers, increasing mission
capabilities, etc.” Meeting mission needs, national security, and cost savings were
common responses from both lower- and middle-level employees from both employment
groups. Six of the eight upper-level employees from both employment groups were
focused on meeting mission needs and national security.
Mission Progression

Twenty-eight of the 44 participants perceived mission progression when
Department of Defense functions are outsourced to private sector companies when
requirements are well defined and function dependent (see Figure 8).

Does Not Progess
Mission
Progresses Mission
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Figure 8. Perceptions of mission progression – all participants.

One private sector employee (SP 37) who had previously been employed in the
federal sector (Department of Defense civilian sub-group) provided an extreme response
and stated, “No, hampers and endangers DoD missions.” In addition, a federal sector
employee (SP 12) who had previously been employed in both the active duty military
sub-group and the private sector discussed the outsourcing efforts since 9/11 and stated,
“I think this has contributed to a very unhealthy environment in which retired/ex-military
members help defense contractors define requirements for the DoD rather than the other
way around.”
Participants from the lower- and middle-level employee groups expressed concern
with duplication of effort. One lower-level employee (SP 25) stated, “Outsourcing does
nothing for DoD except waste money and not meet any official mission or goal, but takes
that function from a federal employees without cutting that employee.” One middle-level
employee (SP 30) stated, “Outsourcing has become a way to replace manpower which
has been cut or eliminated. Many outsourced functions do not have a specific deliverable
or product and simply used as supplement/replacement personnel.” While most upperlevel employees perceived mission progression as being dependent on the function, one
upper-level employee (SP 22) stated, “No. I believe that outsourcing DoD functions
detracts from our ability to be effective because civilian organizations cannot be held to
the same stringent standard as military personnel.”

69
Contributions to Effectiveness
Twenty-eight of the 44 participants perceive that hiring private sector employees
as technical experts contributes to the effectiveness of the Department of Defense.
Belonging to the active duty military sub-group, study participant (SP 19) stated,
Most individuals that are contractors were usually prior military or have
worked in the federal government for years, so they have the background,
clearance, experience, and training needed to be able to function with little
or no assistance or serious training. I believe the government outsources
private companies in order to provide a ‘civilian’ point of view that can be
overshadowed when much work is political or militant.
A Department of Defense civilian (SP 12) with prior experience as an active duty
military member and as a private sector employee stated, “In the case of services based
support the effectiveness is enhanced in that personnel can be used for positions that
require unique training and skill sets.”
In addition to technical experts, participants from all three employee
management levels and both employment groups perceived that positions which allow
the federal sector to focus on preparations for combat operations contribute to
effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions. Middle-level employee
(SP 3) stated, “During surge periods of work, outsourcing allows the DoD to support its
missions. Additionally, outsourcing to experts within specialized portions of industry
affords the DoD the knowledge within the resource as well as their professional
network.”
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Hurts Effectiveness
When participants were asked to describe what hurts effectiveness when
outsourcing Department of Defense functions, a variety of responses were received.
Thirty-six of 44 participants noted poorly written contracts, government funding cycles,
poorly defined requirements, private sector employees writing requirements and
performing other inherently government functions, as well as private sector employees
performing duplicate work as federal sector employees across the employment groups.
Ten of the 14 participants who had not been previously employed in another
employment groups were among these 36 respondents. One private sector employee
(SP 42) stated,
I have witnessed where DoD customers relied so heavily on their
contractor staff that they could no longer describe or define the work being
performed, which was evident when the work was being re-competed due
as the contract was ending. At this also lead to the DoD customer asking
the contractor to help write the contract requirements for the re-compete.
One active duty military member (SP 15) perceived poorly written contracts as a
factor in regards to hurting effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense
functions. SP 15 stated,
The DoD’s lack of comprehensively understanding everything written in a
particular contractor, so that the DoD must go back, rewrite specific tasks
to be completed by the contractor (who has already won with the lowest
bid), now the contract costs more to the government.”
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A private sector employee (SP 23) with prior experience in the active duty
military sub-group believed some privately contracted jobs could be converted to
Department of Defense civilian positions in order to save money, based on contractors
remaining in the same position for lengthy periods of time. SP 23 stated, “The point of
outsourcing is to save money by temporarily bringing in someone (an expert) to solve a
problem.” Another private sector employee (SP 25) with prior experience in the active
duty military sub-group stated, “Outsourcing to remove a function from a federal
employee but without removing the federal employee helps nothing.” A Department of
Defense civilian with previous experience as a private contractor and as an active duty
military member (SP 31) questioned the effort of private sector companies in keeping
quality personnel and stated, “I’ve seen contractors come and go. Lack of continuity
hurts effectiveness.”
All three employee levels from both employment groups expressed concern about
outsourcing inherently governmental functions and poor contract management. The
employees believed private sector employees are writing requirements and performing
inherently governmental functions such as intelligence, combat and security functions.
Upper-level employee (SP 5) responded, “When we outsource security details I think we
impact readiness.” In addition, the employees believe poorly written contracts with
unlimited scope and sole sourcing are hurting effectiveness. Middle-level employee (SP
1) offered, “When there are vendors monopolizing business, it puts DoD at the vendor’s
mercy, which in turn allows them to deliver the products or provide whatever type of
service they see fit.”
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Implementation of Private Sector Values
Twenty-seven of the 44 participants approved the implementation of private
sector values conditionally. Conditions included the need to recognize and adhere to
Department of Defense mission needs, limiting implementation to business processes,
and to inspire team motivation (see Figure 9).

Meet Mission
Needs

Implementing
Private Sector
Values

Business
Processes

Team
Motivation

Figure 8. Implementation of private sector values – all participants.

Participants from both employment groups identified the need to quit penalizing
future budgets for previous lack of spending. A federal sector employee (SP 30) stated,
“The mentality of spend it, or lose it next year results in massive waste.” A private sector
employee (SP 42) who had prior experience in the active duty military sub-group stated,
“Over my tenure supporting the DoD, I have witnessed considerable waste and
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inefficiency to include a culture that promotes spending every dollar in the budget so the
budget doesn’t go down in the next year.” Eight of the 15 lower-level employees
perceived implementing private sector values could address removal of impeding rules
and useless functions, and to empower employees. Middle-level employees were also
concerned with empowering and motivating employees by implementing some private
sector values. One middle-level employee (SP 12) stated, “The current system has
proven to be ineffective in terms of motivating and rewarding higher performers.” None
of the upper-level employees were in full favor of implementing private sector values to
reform the federal sector. One upper-level employee (SP 5) explained, “Excess capacity
is a necessity in the federal sector at times, something that isn’t always acceptable in
private sector.” Another upper-level employee (SP 21) offered that business processes
such as “LEAN and Business Process Reengineering have sometimes proven beneficial
when effectively implemented.”
Fair Treatment
When asked if privately contracted employees were being treated fairly within the
co-location of federal employees, the participants responded with the most diverse and
emotional comments. One federal sector employee (SP 44) who had prior experience as
a private sector employee stated, “Yes, sometimes contractors are treated better by
federal supervisors than federal employees are treated by federal supervisors.” Another
federal sector employee (SP 13) with no prior experience in the private sector perceived,
“Yes, and sometimes the treatment is ‘too fair’ in relation to getting away with things that
federal employees would not get away with (i.e. sexual harassment allegations, poor
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work ethic/performance, etc.)” A private sector employee who had never worked in the
federal sector (SP 49) stated,
No. In my thirty plus years working in this environment, it is rare that you
have a situation where a government manager can look at a mix of GS and
contract employees and see a single team working to achieve a goal. The
GS employees are always the insiders and the contract employees are
always looked upon with some suspicion.
On a more positive note, one private sector employee who had prior active duty military
experience (SP 47) stated, “Absolutely, we work as a team minus requirements and
budget.”
Each employment group recognized the difference in access to base/post services
and unequal assets and work spaces. Five of the 20 private sector employees, all with
prior experience in the federal sector, perceived fair treatment of private sector
employees in a co-located environment as dependent upon the ‘client organization’; as
did three of the four federal sector employees who had prior experience in the private
sector employment group. One federal employee with prior experience with the private
sector employment group (SP 3) stated,
This greatly varies by location and the leadership at the time. In some of
the places I’ve worked as a contractor, we were seen as a member of the
team and afforded the same respect and rights of the other employees.
However, other locations I’ve worked, the contractors have been treated
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very poorly, stuffed into cramped work areas, and made to feel like 3rd
class citizens.
The lower- and middle-level employees acknowledged that work spaces
and other resources were sometimes unequal in quality and size. The upper-level
employees had the most varied responses. One upper-level employee (SP 42)
expressed concern for possible unprofessional relationships developing between
federal and private sector employees. Another upper-level employee (SP 59)
acknowledged fairness as being, “dependent on a host of factors specific to each
particular contract environment, less fair for those contractors employed in
combat zones, more fair for those in office environments.”
The most significant themes were national security, tax payer savings, function
dependent, technical expertise, poor contract management, and over reliance on the
private sector. Maintaining national security, while saving tax payer dollars, was a
concern to a majority of the participants. Study participant 13 (SP 13) stated that the
variation between effectiveness and effectiveness in the Department of Defense context
was attributed to “monetary savings, force multipliers, increasing mission capabilities,
etc.” Study participant 10 (SP10) stated, “Being good stewards of public funding by
identifying and implementing solutions that are mission-focused and sustainable.”
A majority of the study participants perceived that the effectiveness of
outsourcing Department of Defense functions is dependent upon the function performed.
When asked if outsourcing Department of Defense functions progresses the mission,
study participant 23 (SP 23) stated, “I believe it can, if they outsource the correct
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functions.” Study participant 38 (SP 38) answered, “It depends on the function.
Generally, the more rapid/critical/lethal the function is the less viable outsourcing is.”
The majority of study participants also believed that functions requiring technical
expertise progresses the mission of the Department of Defense. Study participant 4 (SP
4) noted, “Yes. There are some specialized functions that require deep experience or
subject matter expertise for which it would either not be cost-effective or not practical to
perform internally to the department.” Study participant 42 (SP 42) suggested, “While
there are core components that can’t be outsourced (e.g. Combat function), others are
clearly better suited for contractor staff to perform (e.g. researching and developing new
technology, building new weapon systems, military support functions, etc.)”
Poor contract management and over reliance on private sector employees
were the most common themes from the responses. Study participant 4 (SP 4)
stated,
DoD contracting strategies can sometimes hurt effectiveness. For
example, a recent contract for services at my location reduced the baseline
qualifications and pay scales for contractors eligible to the point where it
is unlikely that the contractors hired under the contract have the
qualifications (advanced degrees, experience levels to match the needs of
the organization.
Study participant 55 (SP 55) also expressed a concern for poorly written contracts and
stated, “Much of what I have seen is that contracts are ‘cut and pasted’ from other
contracts – this exponentially decreases the effectiveness of the contract.” Study
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participant 9 (SP 9) added, “Long term and open-ended contracts. Contracts likes these
are expensive and divert funds from needed military requirements.” Over reliance of
private sector employees was noted in many participant responses. Study participant 42
(SP 42) acknowledged,
I have witnessed where DoD customers relied so heavily on their
contractor staff that they could no longer describe or define the work being
performed, which was evident when the work was being re-competed due
as the contract was ending. At times this also has led to the DoD customer
asking the contractor to help write the contract requirements for the recompete.
Study participant 47 (SP 47) also stated, “Outsourcing people to help decide on
requirements and implementation leaves too many ‘loyalty’ questions – is the contractor
actually working for the betterment of the government/mission and nor for “more
business.” Study participant 12 (SP 12) discussed the outsourcing efforts since 9/11 and
stated, “I think this has contributed to a very unhealthy environment in which retired/exmilitary members help defense contractor define requirements for the DoD rather than the
other way around.”
The majority of the participant responses were similar in nature for each interview
question. However, two discrepant cases were noted. When asked if outsourcing
Department of Defense functions progresses the mission, two responses stood out from
the other responses. Study participant 19 (SP 19) went beyond acknowledging the good
qualities of private sector employees and stated,
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I do believe outsourcing DoD responsibilities progresses the Department.
For example, our communications department is excellent, and to be
honest, most of them are contractors from various companies in the D.C.
area. I almost forget they are contractors because they are so dedicated to
the mission and our office, and I see them on a daily basis because they
work around the corner from me. They have some of the most
experienced and brightest people working in their department. I learn a lot
from them and appreciate their willingness to assist, dedication,
promptness, competence in their fields, and creativity.
Study participant 19 belongs to the active duty military member sub-group. Another
response that stood out came from a private sector employee who was previously
employed in the Department of Defense civilian sub-group, study participant 37. Study
participant 37 (SP 37) stated, “I believe outsourcing DoD functions hampers and
endangers the missions within the DoD.” While these two responses appeared to be
extreme, these discrepant responses were folded into the analysis as examples of differing
themes in the coding process.
Summary
This research study gained insight on the perceived effectiveness of Department
of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted companies from the view of both
federal and privately contracted employees. Generally, the perceptions of both the
federal sector and privately contracted sector employment groups towards the
effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions to the private sector are
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similar in nature. After reviewing all of the data, a basic description was created and
categories were based on collective participant responses, experience in other
employment groups, and employee management level. These categories emerged as the
most significant with regard to the demographics. Age, gender, functional community,
years employed within current employment group, and leadership/supervisory position
did not provide any significant themes. The most significant themes were national
security, tax payer savings, function dependent, technical expertise, poor contract
management, and over reliance on the private sector.
This chapter described the setting and presented the participant demographics.
Next, how the data were collected and analyzed, and evidence of trustworthiness were
discussed. Chapter 4 then concluded with a presentation of the study results and a
discussion regarding discrepant cases. Chapter 5 will include a summary of the study,
interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, and implications
of the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this research study was to gain insight on the perceived
effectiveness of Department of Defense functions outsourced to privately contracted
companies from the view of both federal and privately contracted employees. This study
collected data from the two employment groups of public and private sector employees.
While the employment groups represented the public and private sectors, a certain level
of homogenization was present between the participants. This study was conducted to
provide a more in-depth picture of outsourcing Department of Defense functions.
Participants perceived value in outsourcing some Department of Defense functions but
believed current processes negatively affecting effectiveness. Current processes most
negatively affecting effectiveness were federal sector based processes, including poor
contract management and oversight.
Interpretation of the Findings
A common theme throughout the literature included poor contract management
and oversight. Poor contract management and oversight were also a common theme
throughout the participant responses. This research study confirmed that poor contract
management is hurting effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions to
privately contracted companies. Thirty seven of the 44 participants from both
employment groups perceived difficulties with the contract vendor selection process, lack
of contract timeliness, and poorly written contracts. Lavallee (2010) discovered a lack of
accountability and transparency in the use of privately contracted employees within the
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Department of Defense. Lavallee’s discovery was confirmed by both employment
groups. Participants highlighted the need for a specific end date, goal, and objective
when creating requirements leading to a well written contract.
Evidence of privately contracted employees fulfilling roles deemed inherently
governmental was present in the literature (U.S. GAO, 2013; Wedel, 2011). Per
Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, paragraph 4(c), it is illegal to outsource
inherently governmental functions (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Personnel
and Readiness, 2010). Ten-percent of the study participants from both employment
groups perceived privately contracted employees writing contract requirements and
performing inherently governmental functions.
Dickinson (2011) warned that the intermingling of privately contracted employees
and military members may weaken the military culture. This study did not find any
evidence of a weakening of the military culture based on intermingling of privately
contracted employees and military members. However, 16 of the 20 privately contracted
employees interviewed were former active duty military members with experience and
training in the military culture. Dickinson (2011) also suggested a lack of prestige
associated with military contracting specialists based on limited opportunities for career
advancement within the ranks. This lack of prestige was not discussed by any of the
participants. However, only one participant self-identified as a contracting employee.
The sole contracting employee was a Department of Defense civilian and not an active
duty military member.
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Drastic decreases in the Department of Defense budget has led to personnel cuts
as announced by the Office of Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army,
and the U.S. Navy (Air Force News Service, 2013; Commander, Navy Installations
Command Public Affairs, 2013; Hagel, 2013; Odierno, 2013). As federal employee
numbers are reduced, private sector employees will be in greater need. Participants from
both employment groups perceived difficulty in rapid technical training for federal
employees. Participants perceived the inability to quickly develop federal employees will
require private sector employees to fulfill the gaps.
Schaub and Franke (2010) recommended further research be conducted to explore
relationships between military and private sector employees. None of the eight active
duty military members had experience in any other category of employment. Sixteen of
the 20 privately contracted employees had prior active duty military experience. Based
on the large number of former active duty military members now employed as private
contractors, there was very little evidence of dissent between the private sector and active
duty military members. However, there was evidence of dissent between the privately
contracted employees and the Department of Defense civilians. A private sector
employee (SP 25) stated, “If a federal employee does nothing all day and really has no
job function they are kept on.”
Moore (2011) recommended further research to determine fair treatment of
private sector employees when co-located with federal civil servants in a federal
workplace. The responses to this interview question were the most diverse and emotional
in the study. The most common (eight of 44) responses perceived fair treatment of
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private sector employees in a co-located federal workplace as dependent upon the client
organization. Each employment group recognized the difference in access to base/post
services, and unequal assets and work spaces. The majority of Moore’s (2011)
participants favored traditional public service values, and approved implementation of
private sector values as an essential means of reforming the federal sector. This study
found that members of both employment groups (27 of 44) approved the implementation
of private sector values based on conditions that included mission needs, limiting
implementation to specific business processes, and in support of team motivation. In
addition, participants perceived the just-in-time private sector value would not work to
meet the mission needs of the Department of Defense.
Conceptual Framework
Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett’s (1999) theory of privatization argued that
privatization is a, “political phenomenon versus an economic response to growth of the
state and cost of state provision” (p. 1). The study found evidence of perceived political
motivation for outsourcing Department of Defense functions. Participants from both
employment groups identified privately contracted employees inappropriately writing
contract requirements and illegally performing inherently governmental functions. A
private sector employee with prior experience as an active duty military member (SP 33)
stated, “In my time on both sides, I’ve seen numerous functions contracted out, not
because it was the smart thing to do, but because political decisions led to manpower cuts
which forced hasty outsourcing efforts.” Political motivation for outsourcing Department
of Defense functions was also evident through duplication of effort. A Department of
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Defense civilian with prior active duty military experience (SP 46) expressed that
effectiveness is hurt, “When contract developers complete the same work as
military/civilian folks. In my example, [it is] creating CBTs [computer based training].”
In addition, a private sector employee with prior experience as an active duty military
member (SP 25) stated,
Outsourcing to remove a function from a federal employee but without
removing the federal employee helps nothing. Creating functions like
development of a slide to display outdated data does not help leadership to
make information decisions, but creates a place for a former federal
employee (active duty military retiring) to work.
From the economic perspective, participants perceived outsourcing
Department of Defense functions as being costly. A federal sector employee (SP
27) perceived, “Many times outsourcing can cost less in the short term but be
overall more expensive in the long term.” Another federal sector employee (SP
13) stated, “Outsourcing usually costs more money.” And a private sector
employee (SP 25) noted,
Outsourcing does nothing for DoD except waste money and not meet any
official mission or goal, but takes that function from a federal employee
without cutting that employee. In overall concept, it decreases the
effectiveness to the DoD to execute funds and manning correctly.
On the contrary, this study discovered situations in which outsourcing Department
of Defense can be economically feasible. Twenty-eight of the 44 participants perceived
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that employing private sector employees as technical experts could contribute to
effectiveness. A federal sector employee (SP 12) stated,
In the case of services based support the effectiveness is enhanced in that
personnel can be used for positions that require unique training and skill
sets. Unless Congress increases the end strength for the services or the
civil service positions, outsourcing is part of the overall necessary strategy
to maintain effectiveness.
Limitations of the Study
The participants in this study were Department of Defense civilian employees,
active duty military members, and privately contracted employees who were either
currently working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within the
past two years. I had access to voluntary participants fitting this criterion. This study
included 44 total participants. The federal employment group was represented by 24
employees, consisting of 16 Department of Defense civilians and 8 active duty military
members. The private sector employment group was represented with 20 employees.
Sixteen of the 20 private sector employees were prior active duty military members. The
inability to locate a majority of privately contracted employees who had never been
employed in the active duty military sub-group may have limited the perceptions from
the private sector employment group. Study participants represented 14 different
functional communities. The functional communities represented were: engineering,
information systems/cyber, acquisition, mission support, operations, contracting, security,
education and doctrine, logistics, intelligence, medical, manpower/personnel, and
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strategic plans and policy. The federal employment group represented the following
functional communities: information systems/cyber, acquisition, operations, contracting,
security, education and doctrine, logistics, intelligence, medical, manpower/personnel,
and strategic plans & policy. The private sector employment group represented only five
of the functional communities: engineering, information systems/cyber, acquisition,
mission support, and operations.
Delimitations of the Study
The study participants were confined to only Department of Defense civilian
employees, active duty military members, and privately contracted employees who were
either currently working in a federal/contractor mixed environment or had done so within
the past 2 years. In addition, none of the participants were currently serving in a combat
zone. The participant pool was expanded to include those who had worked in a
federal/contractor mixed environment within the past 2 years based on the mobile nature
of those fitting the criterion. Data were collected through e-mailed surveys and document
reviews from official government web sites. All necessary government documents were
available for review from official government web sites. The two necessary government
documents were the Federal Acquisition Regulation (2005) containing updated Federal
Acquisition Circulars FAC 2005-09, Subpart 7.5 – Inherently Governmental Functions
(2006) and FAC 2005-73, Subpart 19.8 – Contracting with the Small Business
Administration (The 8(a) Program) (2014).
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Recommendations
According to Creswell (2009), the qualitative method of research is a problem
best understood by exploring a concept or phenomenon. The qualitative method of
research allows the researcher to explore a topic when the theory base is unknown
(Creswell, 2009). Within the qualitative research method there is more focus on data
collection, analysis, and writing (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative data are collected through
interviews, observations, and document review (Patton, 2002). Surveying federal and
privately contracted employees working together on a day to day basis to accomplish the
mission of defending the United States through Department of Defense functions
provided a window into the perceptions of the effectiveness of outsourcing such
functions. This study begins the discussion of the effectiveness of outsourcing
Department of Defense functions from the view of directly affected employees from both
employment groups. While this study discovered a general lack of perceived
effectiveness of outsourcing the Department of Defense, additional research and
evaluation are warranted. Recommendations for future research are discussed below.
Outsourcing Department of Defense functions is highly complex, and
encompasses approximately 1.98 million federal sector employees and 669, 698 privately
contracted employees (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, 2013). This study included participants from both employment groups and
14 different functional communities. Dickinson (2011) suggested a lack of prestige
associated with military contracting specialists based on limited opportunities for career
advancement within the ranks. This lack of prestige was not discussed by any of the
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participants. However, only one participant self-identified as a contracting employee.
The sole contracting employee was a Department of Defense civilian and not an active
duty military member. Based on the lack of an active duty military contracting specialist
in the study, it is recommended that additional research be conducted focused on the
perceptions of active duty military contracting specialists.
Dickinson (2011) warned that the intermingling of privately contracted employees
and military members may weaken the military culture. This study did not find any
evidence of a weakening of the military culture. However, 16 of the 20 privately
contracted employees interviewed were former active duty military members with
experience and training in the military culture. Based on this large number, it is
recommended that further research be conducted focused on the perceptions of privately
contracted employees who have no prior active duty military experience. However, with
the personnel cuts within the federal sector, I believe future research will also be limited
in locating private contracted employees without active duty military experience. As
active duty military members separate or retire from active duty, it is expected they will
continue to be the employees of choice to fulfill Department of Defense functions
outsourced to private sector companies.
The federal sector must develop, implement and enforce standards across the
Department of Defense for proper contract management and oversight. The standards
need to be created at the Joint Staff-level, with input and buy in from each military
branch/department. The implementation of these better standards for proper contract
management and oversight must be administered at all levels—starting from the military
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branch/department down to the local Department of Defense civilian and active duty
military members affected by outsourcing Department of Defense functions to the private
sector. Enforcement of standards must be conducted on a continual basis through annual
inspections, and a dedicated, anonymous method for blowing the whistle on improper
contract management, such as private sector employees performing inherently
governmental functions.
Creating better and clearer standards for proper contract management and
oversight must be communicated to all employees affected by the outsourcing of
Department of Defense functions. I recommend education and communication at all
levels, to include federal sector employees and private sector employees. Federal sector
employees should be educated on standards for proper contract management and
oversight, and the roles and responsibilities of both employment groups. Private sector
employees should be educated by the federal sector on their specific roles and
responsibilities within their local working environment.

Implications for Positive Social Change
There are several possible implications for social change after completing this
research. The perceptions expressed by the study participants have created a strong
argument to assist leaders with better decision making in support of national security
policies, while providing good stewardship of tax payer funds and providing transparency
to the nation. The lack of perceived effectiveness from the participants reflected a
consistent problem with contract management and oversight. Acknowledgement of poor
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contract management and oversight, to include private sector employees performing
illegal functions, may lead to stricter standards, policies, and penalties. Department of
Defense leaders and lawmakers need to work together to ensure national security policies
are transparent, and cost-advantageous. The Department of Defense continues to allow
private sector employees to illegally perform inherently governmental functions.
Performance of these illegal functions must be addressed by lawmakers, and penalties
must be established and enforced.
This study provided a voice for the employees directly affected by outsourcing
Department of Defense functions. Employees from both employment groups need to be
better educated in the roles and responsibilities of each group. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (2005) is a very large and cumbersome document which is difficult to read
and understand. Developing an education program to inform the employees of each
employment group proper tools to legally meet contractual requirements will provide a
positive change to the outsourcing of Department of Defense functions. Understanding
roles and responsibilities, coupled with education of contractual requirements, will
provide a fundamental baseline for both employment groups to perform their assigned
duties in an effective manner. Effectiveness in the Department of Defense leads to strong
national security.
Conclusion
As President Eisenhower departed the White House (1961), he warned of the
impending “military-industrial complex” and its’ “unwarranted influence” (p.1). Over 50
years later, the Department of Defense has become very reliant on privately contracted
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companies to perform functions that support national security. Although the study
consisted of two employment groups representing 14 functional communities and a wide
array of experience, there were many common themes within each interview question.
These similar responses proved a certain level of homogenization has occurred within the
two employment groups. The Department of Defense spends billions of dollars annually
on outsourcing functions to privately contracted companies. However, Department of
Defense funding has been drastically cut since 2010; reduced by $189.4 billion from
fiscal year 2010 to the proposed 2014 fiscal year budget (U.S. Government Printing
Office, n.d.; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Comptroller, 2014a).
The climate and effectiveness of a working environment are shaped by the
perceptions of leaders, managers, and employees within an organization (Otara, 2011).
This study focused on how employees think about or understand the effectiveness of
outsourcing within the Department of Defense from their own experiences. Many federal
and privately contracted employees work together on a day to day basis to accomplish the
mission of defending the United States. These two employment groups provided direct
insight into the perceived effectiveness of outsourced functions. Understanding the
employees’ perceived effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions
provided valuable insight to how the Department of Defense mission is being
accomplished.
The collected data were inductively analyzed to establish a lack of perceived
effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions from both the federal
sector employees and the privately contracted employees. Both federal sector and private
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sector employees directly affected by the outsourcing of Department of Defense
functions perceived current processes are hurting the effectiveness of outsourcing efforts.
With the impending decreases in federal sector personnel and funding, the Department of
Defense must reform these processes. Based on the perceptions of these federal sector
and private sector employees, federal sector processes in support of outsourcing efforts
must be addressed. Most importantly, contract management and oversight reform must
be addressed immediately.
Outsourcing Department of Defense functions is highly complex, and
encompasses approximately 1.98 million federal sector employees and 669, 698 privately
contracted employees (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense-Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, 2013). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (2005) is a very large and
cumbersome document which is difficult to read and understand. Developing an
education program to inform the employees of each employment group proper tools to
legally meet contractual requirements will increase effectiveness of outsourcing
Department of Defense functions. Education and communication are recommended for
both the public sector employees and private sector employees at all levels. Federal
sector employees should be educated on standards for proper contract management and
oversight, and the roles and responsibilities of both employment groups. Private sector
employees should be educated by the federal sector on their specific roles and
responsibilities within their local working environment. Understanding roles and
responsibilities, coupled with education of contractual requirements, will provide a
fundamental baseline for both employment groups to perform their assigned duties in an
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effective manner. Outsourcing Department of Defense functions will continue to
increase as federal sector employee funding and personnel are decreased. Effective
outsourcing of Department of Defense functions will lead to strong national security and
responsible stewardship of U.S. tax dollars.
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Appendix A: Interview Questions
1) Which employment group do you belong, federal employee or private
sector employee?
2) How do you define ‘effectiveness’?
3) How do you define ‘effectiveness’ in the Department of Defense context?
4) Do you believe outsourcing Department of Defense functions progresses
the mission of the Department?
5) Describe what, if anything, about Department of Defense outsourcing you
believe contributes to effectiveness?
6) Describe what, if anything, about Department of Defense outsourcing you
believe hurts effectiveness?
7) Do you approve of the implementation of private sector values as an
essential means of reforming the federal sector?
8) Do you believe privately contracted employees receive fair treatment
within the co-location with federal employees?
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Appendix B: Participant Background Information
BACKGROUND (CLASSIFICATION) QUESTIONS:
1. What is your name?
(information will be converted to a Study Participant number; i.e. SP1)
2. What is your age range?
(Choose Age Range) 18 - 29; 30 - 39; 40 - 49; 50 - 59; 60+
3. What is your gender?
(Choose One) Male or Female
4. What employment group do you represent?
(Choose One) Department of Defense Civilian; Active Military Member; Private
Contractor
5. How many years have you been employed within this employment group?
(Choose a Year Range) Less than 1; 1 - 5; 6 - 10; 11 - 15; 16 - 20; 20+
6. In which functional community do you currently work?
(Choose One) Manpower & Personnel; Intelligence; Operations; Logistics; Strategic
Plans & Policy; Information Systems/Cyber; Maintenance; Medical; Finance; Mission
Support; Security; Other_______
7. Have you been employed within the one or both of the other employment groups (i.e.
currently in privately contracted employment group but once served as active military
member)? If so, which employment group and how many years?
8. Department of Defense civilians, which pay grade band are you currently within?
(Choose One) GS-1 through GS-6; GS-7 through GS-14; GS-15 through SES
9. Active military members, which pay grade band are you currently within?
(Choose One) E-1 through E-6; E-7 through O-4; O-5 through O-10
10. Privately contracted employees, which management level do you currently hold?
(Choose One) Lower-Level Management; Middle-Level Management; Upper-Level
Management
11. Are you in a leadership/supervisory position within your current work center?
(Choose One) Yes or No
(If “Yes” Choose One) Upper-Level Management; Middle-Level Management; LowerLevel Management; No = Non-supervisory
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Appendix C: Consent Form
CONSENT FORM

You are invited to take part in a research study of Employees’ Perceived Effectiveness of
Outsourcing Department of Defense Functions. The researcher is inviting Department of
Defense civilian employees, active duty military members, and privately contracted
employees hired by private contracted companies to perform Department of Defense
functions to be in this study. The study participants must either currently work in a
federal/contractor mixed environment or have done so within the past two years, not in a
combat zone. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Theresa Corzine, who is a doctoral
student at Walden University.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to gain insight on the perceived effectiveness of Department
of Defense functions outsourced to private contracted employees from the view of both
federal and privately contracted employees who are not serving in a combat zone.
Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to:
• Complete background information questionnaire
• Answer 8 open-ended questions via personal email (Do NOT use a work email
address)
Here are some sample questions:
1. Do you believe outsourcing Department of Defense functions progresses the
mission of the Department?
2. How do you define ‘effectiveness’ in the Department of Defense context?
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you
choose to be in the study. If you decide to join the study now, you can still change your
mind later. You may stop at any time.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be
encountered in daily life, such as recalling an uncomfortable experience. Being in this
study will not pose risk to your safety or wellbeing.
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This study can potentially provide senior leaders with a better understanding of the
perceptions of effectiveness of outsourcing Department of Defense functions, allowing
them to make better informed decisions regarding the expenditures of US tax dollars.
This study can impact social change in areas of lawmaking to ensure national security
policies are effective and cost-advantageous.
Potential Conflicts of Interest:
Individuals who have been or are currently being supervised or instructed by the
researcher or Larry M. Corzine are not permitted to participate in this study.
Payment:
There is none.
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will not use your
personal information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also, the
researcher will not include your name or anything else that could identify you in the
study reports. Data will be kept secure by password-protected storage devices containing
information protection software (i.e. anti-virus, anti-spyware). Data will be kept for a
period of at least 5 years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant,
you can call …. She is the Walden University representative who can discuss this with
you. Her phone number is … Walden University’s approval number for this study is 0520-14-0151752 and it expires on May 19, 2015. Please print or save this consent form
for your records.
Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a
decision about my involvement. By completing and returning the attached forms , I
understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.
Attachments:
Background information questionnaire
Interview questionnaire
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Appendix D: Volunteer Announcement Letter

Volunteers
Wanted for a Research Study
Research on Employees’ Perceived Effectiveness of Outsourcing
Department of Defense Functions
(Department of Defense Civilians, Active Duty Military Members, and Privately
Contracted Employees performing Department of Defense Functions)

Type of Study: Research is being conducted on Department of Defense civilian
employees, active duty military members, and privately contracted employees performing
Department of Defense functions to explore effectiveness of outsourcing Department of
Defense functions. The purpose of this study is to gain insight on the perceived
effectiveness of Department of Defense functions outsourced to private contracted
companies from the view of both federal employees (Department of Defense civilians
and active military members) and privately contracted employees. Participants are
required to participate through personal email addresses only. Work email is strictly
prohibited.
Eligibility Criteria: Department of Defense civilian employees, active military
members, and privately contracted employees either currently working in a
federal/contractor mixed environment or have done so within the past two years, who are
not serving in a combat zone.
Benefits: Participation in this study is free. The outcomes of the study include better
information for decision making regarding funding and personnel. The study may also
affect additional policy recommendations for management at the Department of Defense.
Contact Information: If interested in participating, please contact Theresa Corzine,
MPA at
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Theresa Corzine, who is a doctoral
student at Walden University. This research is being conducted under the direction of the
researcher’s doctoral committee in support of the researcher’s doctoral dissertation.
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